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Abstract 
 
 
 
This work presents the results of an empirical research with the target of modeling the stylized 
facts of the daily ex-post   System Marginal Price (SMP) of the Greek wholesale electricity 
market, using data from January 2004 to December of 2011. SMP is considered here as the 
footprint of an underline stochastic and nonlinear process  that bears all the information 
reflecting not only the effects of changes in endogenous or fundamental factors of the market 
but also the impacts of a series of regulatory reforms that have continuously changed the 
market’s microstructure.  To capture the dynamics of the conditional mean and volatility of 
SMP that generate the stylized facts (mean-reversion,  price  spikes, fat - tails price distribution  
etc), a number of ARMAX/GARCH models have been estimated using as regressors an extensive 
set of fundamental factors in the Greek electricity market, as well as dummy variables that 
mimic the history of Regulator’s interventions. The findings show that changes in the 
microstructure of the market caused by the reforms have strongly affected the dynamic 
evolution of SMP and that the best found model captures adequately the stylized facts of the 
series that other electricity and financial markets share.  The dynamics of the conditional 
volatility generated by the model can be extremely useful in the efforts that are under way 
towards market restructuring  so the Greek market to be more compatible with the 
requirements of the European Target Model.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Liberalization and deregulation of Electricity Markets, two facts that have characterize, in the 
last decades, this industry, are the main drivers, behind a gradual increase of the degree of 
structural complexity. Therefore, the decision making process of the market’s agents 
(generators, distributors, suppliers, system operators, regulators etc.) is extremely difficult due 
to uncertainty, nonlinearity and unpredictability that are inherent characteristics of any high 
dimensional and nonlinear complex structure. The most representative feature of the 
complexity of electricity markets is its price volatility and the associated with it stylized facts 
i.e the nature of its statistical properties. Volatility is roughly the continuous change with time 
of the standard deviation of price changes, conditional on the most recent information 
available, a concept that is central in this paper. Electricity price volatility has a set of peculiar 
“footprints” (the aforementioned stylized facts), which are universal statistical characteristics 
commonly encountered in financial markets (Campbell J., et al, 1997, Taylor J.S., 2005).  
 
There will be cases in which demand exceed supply (e.g when Unit availability is constrained or 
equivalently load is curtailed) and competitive pricing is impossible, causing prices to exhibit 
high volatility i.e. price spikes the level and duration of which are difficult to forecast (an  
ideal condition for the exercise of market power). Inadequacies also of the Transmission 
system enhance the complexity of Electricity markets which become more prone to problems 
with local market power 
The Greek Electricity Market, GEM henceforth, as all other Day-Ahead markets, exhibits a high 
degree of volatility. This is because both demand-side and supply-side of the market depend on 
a large number of fundamental variables i.e. the phase space of the dynamics of the market is 
high dimensional and very complex. Price of fuel and CO2, Hydropower reserves, Power Plant 
Unit availability, Renewable Energy Station (RES) power generation, are some of the supply 
variables while labor factors, other macroeconomic variables as well as temperature constitute 
the set of demand factors. Another factor that has increase the degree of complexity (and so the 
price volatility) of GEM is the gradual and dramatic increase of the number of its agents 
(generators, suppliers, marketers or qualified energy brokers and of licensed companies that 
trade electricity), during the last five years. As a consequence of this high volatility is the need 
for the adoption in the market of a number of hedging instruments used in financial markets to 
reduce the degree of uncertainty, inherent in volatile markets. This is also a requirement of the 
Target Model described below. 
Greek Electricity Market, is a component of the Central – South European regional market (CSE 
Region), together with France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Slovenia, heading towards its 
coupling, in the end of 2014, with the Unified European Electricity Market or Target Model1 
which is in a process of developing. To this target, RAE, the Regulator of the market, proposes 
its drastic restructuring in order to alleviate all possible current distortions and simultaneously 
to enhance the degree of competition within the market as well as its structural compatibility 
requirements of the target model. The most pronounced structural incompatibilities are: a) 
GEM’s indirect auctioning system of short-term interconnection rights b) the lack of intra-day 
market component c) market’s operation schedules not coordinated with other markets d) the 
co-optimization of Energy and Ancillary services e) its DAS technical solution f) Market’s 
clearance issues g) regulated max/min Bidding prices h) variable cost recovery mechanism and 
j) its incompatible structure to adopt a forward market, FM.   
The introduction of FM is by itself one of the structural changes in the market that has to be 
made so GEM can be well “fitted” to the Target Model. Forward Contracts are expected to be 
introduced in the GEM for example in the form of Generation Bids auctioning, written in such a 
                                                          
1 The principles of designing this new European Electricity Marker are described in details in the site of ACER 
(Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators). 
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way to account for different zones of Consumption and having different maturity time as well 
as contracts related to Financial or Physical Transmission Rights (RAE 2011).  
However, any efforts towards alleviating the distortions of the market, restructuring – 
reengineering the market to meet Target’s model standards, have as a prerequisite an, in depth, 
understanding (qualitatively as well quantitatively) the underlying dynamics of the wholesale 
or system marginal price, SMP, as this key variable is the criterion for assessing the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of the market. By adequately modeling the stylized facts, i.e. the 
dynamic evolution of SMP one can extract valuable information on the functioning of the 
market since the effects of any distortions and inefficiencies are “incorporated” in the dynamics 
of SMP. This in depth understanding of current and future dynamic evolution of the SMP can be 
achieved, by using models that are capable of replicating the underlying dynamics of SMP on 
which the pricing, in the near future, of forward Contracts will be based.  
We provide at this point a short list of papers on stylized facts. Cont (Cont R., 2001) argues that 
a complete as well as representative list of stylized statistical properties of financial asset 
returns is as follows: Absence of autocorrelations, Gain/loss asymmetry, Heavy tails, 
Aggregation Gaussianity, Intermittency, Volatility clustering, Conditional heavy tails, 
Slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute returns, Leverage effect, Volume/volatility 
correlation and finally, asymmetry in time scales. Weron (Weron R., 2006) provides for 
electricity prices returns, a similar list of stylized facts that indirectly incorporates all the above, 
as follows: Price Spikes, Seasonality, mean-reversion and Heavy tails in the distribution of price 
returns. In the work of C. Dipeng and D. Bunn (Dipeng C. and D. Bunn, 2010) the stylized facts of 
mean-reverting and spiky characteristics of spot prices are captured by a regime-switching 
model and they are considered to be as the nonlinear effects of some exogenous factors acting 
on spot prices. Exogenous factors as demand, reserve margin, large fuel price changes, Carbon 
emission allowances and market concentration-power have nonlinear effects on spot prices 
and consequently on their stylized facts. Regime-switching models are also used by Deng 
(1998), Huisman and Mahieu (2003), Ethier and Mount (1999), to capture price spikes. 
Huisman (Huisman R., 2009) provides an extensive review of the characteristics or stylized 
facts of electricity prices. In their recent work Huisman and Kilic (Huisman R. and M. Kilic, 
2011) examine the evolution of seasonality, mean reversion, time-varying volatility and price 
spikes in the day-ahead electricity prices for the Belgian, Dutch, German, French and 
Scandinavian markets over the years 2003-2010. The impact of changes in the level of reserve 
margin on price spike is examined by Mount (Mount T. et al, 2006), by employing a regime-
switching model. It is shown that the probability of a spike increases in periods with low 
reserve margins. Stylized facts of the Spanish daily spot electricity prices and especially the 
leverage effect characteristic is examined (see section 7 in this work), by using a threshold 
asymmetric autoregressive stochastic volatility (TA-ARSV) model, are described in the work of 
Montero et. al (Montero J.M. et al, 2010). Huisman (Huisman R., 2008) employed switching-
regimes models and found that the probability of price spike occurrence increases when 
temperature deviates substantially from its mean level.  Schwartz (Schwartz E.S., 1997) has 
shown that commodity prices, exhibit strong mean reversion. Pilipovic (Pilipovic D., 1997), 
Weron (Weron R., and B. Przybylowicz, 2000) and Simonsen (Simonsen I., 2003) also have 
observed that electricity spot prices exhibit strong mean reversion as well. If jump behavior is 
included in the models, the accuracy in capturing the stylized facts is increased as it has been 
shown by Kaminsky (1997), Barz and Johnson (1998), Deng (1998), (Deng et al., 2001) and 
Kamat and Oren ( 2001). Long range correlations, measured by Hurst exponent, are examined 
by Erzgraber (2008). Volatility clustering in electricity markets and its comparison with the 
one exhibited by financial markets is described by Weron (Weron R., 2000), and Perello 
(Perello J. et al, 2007).  Very high volatility expressed as a large number of very large or 
extreme changes in price values is investigated by Bystrom (Bystrom H., 2005), for Nord Pool, 
using extreme value theory. We refer also the works by Serletis and Rosenberg (Serletis A. 
and A.A. Rosenberg, 2009, 2007) Elder and Serletis (Elder J. and A. Serletis, 2008) and finally 
Kyrtsou et.al, (Kyrtsou C. et. al, 2009) in which evidence is provided for long memory of 
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antipersistence form (detected by Hurst exponents or detrending moving average, DMA). The 
quantification of complex multiscale correlated behavior and the role of neglected 
nonlinearities in electricity markets and in energy futures prices (as opposed to spot prices) 
are also examined in these works, contributing further to the attempts to describe the degree of 
complexity of energy markets in general compared to the one of financial markets. 
To our knowledge, this is the second empirical work addressing the impact on GEM’s System 
Marginal Price of Regulatory Market Reports or Policy changes (the first attempt is the work of 
Kalantzis (Kalantzis K. et. al, 2012).  However the main advantage of this work however is the 
use of an extensive number of fundamental factors of the Supply side of the market, as 
exogenous regression variables and the in depth analysis of the combined interactions of these 
quantitative variables with the qualitative or dummy variables representing the regulatory 
reforms and their effects on SMP.  Previous similar works are those of Boffa (Boffa et. al, 2010), 
Bollino (Bollino et. al, 2008 a,b ) and Bosco (Bosco et.al, 2007).  This paper enhances  the 
relatively poor literature on modeling GEM’s dynamics (the work of  Theodorou P., et al, 2008 is 
dealing with SMP dynamics but does not consider regulatory impacts). This issue is also related 
to the recent work of Bask and Widerberg  (Bask M. et al, 2009) in which the interaction 
between market structure and stability and volatility of spot prices is examined. However, the 
work conceptually closer to ours, both on its general scope as well as on its specific research 
questions on how regulatory reforms and polices in the Italian market  impact the dynamics of 
SMP,  is the work of Petrella (Petrella et. al, 2012).     
 
The main objective of this work is to answer the following questions: to what extent do typical 
characteristics or stylized facts of electricity spot prices encountered in other markets do exist 
in the Greek electricity market? Is there any inter-dependence between the gradual formation 
of the structure of the Greek electricity market (through its regulatory reforms that the market 
has undergone) and the dynamics of its SMP volatility, stability or complexity? How this 
interdependence can be detected via quantifying the associated stylized facts? How different 
are the stylized facts of an emerging electricity market as the Greek one, compared to other 
fully-developed markets as e.g. the neighbor more mature Italian market or the Nord Pool? 
Another goal is also to contribute to the growing literature on individual case studies and 
comparisons of different electricity market architectures and their associated stylized facts of 
prices, worldwide (Escribano et al., 2002, Andrianesis et al., 2011).  
 
Therefore the authors believe that the findings in this work could be useful as follows:  
 
a) To help in shedding light on any distortions – malfunctions and structural frictions that 
exist in GEM and more importantly in revealing and quantifying the effects of the 
Regulatory changes (by searching for example the side – effects of introducing, such 
mechanism as the Transitional Capacity Adequacy and Cost Recovery mechanisms), 
therefore contributing to the efforts of the appropriate markets’ agents (Regulator, 
System Operator etc.) to detect those structural elements that have to be changed. 
b) Indirectly, by using the findings in this paper to contribute to the efforts of re-
structuring and re-engineering GEM, via a better understanding of the dynamic 
behavior of SMP, an information needed in the process of developing the forward 
market.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section2 we briefly describe GEM, the time 
history of its architecture and the regulatory market reforms with the expected effects on SMP. 
Section 3 provides complete description of the data sets, their pre-processing and required 
tests before modelling. In section 4 we give the specification and fitting results of a number of 
models, the best model found and the necessary tests on its innovations to assess how 
successful the model is in replicating the stylized facts exhibited by SMP. In section 5 the 
interpretation of results is presented while in section 7, using the model, we perform in sample 
forecasts to replicate the impact of reforms on SMP and also compare GEM characteristics with 
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those of other electricity and financial markets.  The paper concludes with conclusions and 
propositions for further research. 
 
2. Greek Electricity Market (GEM)  
Greece has adopted in 2005 a pure mandatory pool for the wholesale electricity market. Its 
implementation was carried out in stages or transitional phases (2000 – 2005, 2005 – 2010 and 
2010–today). The revised market architecture, launched in September 2010, completed in 
2011 its first full year of application,  has determined the Day-Ahead (DA)2  SMP as the 
wholesale market index reminiscent to S&P or ASE index, as this price determines in great 
amounts the cash-flows of market’s players. This market design encapsulate fully the all the 
requirement of the Grid and Market Operation Code of 2005. The design makes a clead 
distinction between the DA market and Balancing mechanism.  The evolution of Index HHI3 
which measures the degree of openness of a market to competition has been reduced from the 
value of 10000 in years 2008 and 2009 to 6844 in 2010 and  5764 in 2011, an improvement of 
the market evolving to a more competitive state. However, GEM is far from being considered a 
competitive market. 
 
 2.1 A brief description of GEM’s architecture and microstructure 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the time evolution of the net generation capacity for Greece. We observe 
a gradual decrease in the share of Lignite Units in the total mixture and an opposite behavior in 
the share of Natural Gas units due to constantly increasing number of investments of 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). More specifically, CCGT Units during period 2004 – 2011 
have increased their share about 124%. The market was completely dominated by PPC until 
2004.  Table 2.2 provides a comparative view of the fuel-Mix generation 2010-11 in the 
Interconnected system of GEM. Table 2.3 provides information on the market volume as well as 
peak power demand for the period 2005-2009. Market volume is defined as the traded volume 
of electricity and is equal to the annual demand (including the interconnection balance), i.e. to 
52,365.8 MWh in 2010 and 51,872.3 in 2011. There are not yet any futures and OTC markets. 
The Greek Electricity System consists of 13 Hydroelectric Stations, HES, installed in six river 
systems. For example, see Table 2.4, the Aheloos river system has three hydraulically coupled 
HES, Kremasta, Kastraki and Stratos. The total energy reserves of the three HES’s dams is the 
times series of the regressor  Ahelenr in table 2.3. The treatment of coupled HES gives a unified 
water value which can be interpreted as opportunity costs of using reservoir water at a specific 
time and not at an optimal later point of time. The HES production depends on the water 
flowing out of the Dam and water management must be done in such a way that the dam levels 
must remain within required range. If the water reserves in a Dam are high, HES Units must 
operate in order to avoid waste of energy due to overspills, while in case of low water reserves, 
operations must be constrained.  
Among the Hydro variables the HES of the Aheloos river has the greater influence, followed by 
the impact of HES of the Aliakmon river (see correlations -0.58 and -0.37 respectively of SMP 
and energy reserves variables). For the period of October 15 to end of May each year, water is 
collected in the Dams while Hydro generator is practically zero. From beginning of June to mid-
October Hydro must-run (for irrigation etc) and generation is taking place. Strong correlations 
                                                          
2
 A short description of the Day-Ahead (DA) market is given in Appendix 1. 
3 HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hishman Index. If HHI = 10000 the market is a monopoly, if HHI > 5000 the market is 
over-concentrated, H > 1800 concentrated,      for 1000 < HHI < 1800 efficiently competitive and HHI ≤ 1000 
competitive. 
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are observed, as expected, between Kremasta Hydro-Dam level (in meters) and the 
corresponding Aheloos energy reserves (MWh) (0.98), and Polyfito Dam level and Aliakmon 
energy reserves (0.97). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Installed capacity as of 2004, and 2007 - 2011 in the interconnected system 
 
 
Table 2.2: Fuel-Mix Generation 2010-11 in the Greek Interconnected System 
 
 2010 (ΤWh) 2011 (ΤWh) % difference 
Lignite 27.44 27.57 0.47 
Fuel Oil 0.11 0.009 -91.82 
Natural Gas 10.36 14.85 43.34 
Large Hydro 6.70 3.68 -45.07 
RES 2.04 2.53 24.02 
Total Local Generation 46.6 48.6 4.29 
Net Imports 5.70 3.23 -43.33 
Grand Total 52.35 51.87 -0.92 
         Source: ADMIE S.A. 
 
 
 
Net 
installed 
capacity 
(MW)
%
Net 
installed 
capacity 
(MW)
%
Net 
installed 
capacity 
(MW)
%
Net 
installed 
capacity 
(MW)
%
Net 
installed 
capacity 
(MW)
%
Net 
installed 
capacity 
(MW)
%
Lignite 4,808.00 43.92% 4,808.00 40.50% 4,808.10 38.69% 4,808.10 38.49% 4,746.00 33.74% 4,496.00 31.30%
HFO (Heavy 
Fuel Oil)
718.00 6.56% 718.00 6.05% 718.00 5.78% 718.00 5.75% 698.00 4.96% 698.00 4.86%
CCGT (Gas 
Turb. Combin. 
Cycle)
1,572.00 14.36% 1,962.00 16.53% 1,962.10 15.79% 1,962.10 15.71% 3,224.00 22.92% 3,526.00 24.55%
Natural gas – 
other (Gas) 
(OCGT)
487.00 4.45% 487.00 4.10% 486.80 3.92% 486.80 3.90% 487.00 3.46% 487.00 3.39%
Hydro plants 
(large)
3,017.00 27.56% 3,017.00 25.41% 3,016.50 24.27% 3,016.50 24.15% 3,018.00 21.46% 3,017.00 21.00%
RES and small 
Cogeneration
345.00 3.15% 880.00 7.41% 993.50 7.99% 1,058.40 8.47% 1,558.00 11.08% 2,141.00 14.90%
Large-scale 
CHP
334.00 2.69% 334.00 2.67% 334.00 2.37%
Other 
Cogeneration
108.00 0.87% 108.00 0.86%
Total 10,947.00 100.00% 11,872.00 100.00% 12,427.00 100.00% 12,491.90 100.00% 14,065.00 100.00% 14,365.00 100.00%
31.12.2011
Plant Type
31.12.2004 31.12.2007 31.12.2008 31.12.2009 31.12.2010
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Table 2.3:  Market Volume, i.e. Energy and peak power demand (2005-2011) for the 
interconnected system (Source: IPTO - ADMIE) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Electricity 
consumption 
excluding 
pump storage 
(GWh) 
52,500.8 53,656.8 55,253.4 55,675.3 52,436.5 52,365.8 51,872.3 
Peak load 
(MW) 
9,635 9,962 
10,610 
(11,110 
including 
curtailed 
load) 
10,393 9,828 9,902 10,055 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 provides information on the main structural components of the Greek wholesale 
Electricity Market (taken from RAE’s 2010 National Report to the European Commission) (RAE, 
2009 and 2010). 
 
Figure 2.1.: Structural components of the Greek wholesale Electricity Market (taken from 
RAE’s 2010 National Report to the European Commission)4. 
                                                          
4 Amended by the authors  to depict the formation of two new entities i.e. LAGIE and ADMIE, out of the former HTSO 
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Table 2.4: Hydroelectric Stations and River systems in GEM 
 
Hydro Electric Station Dam River 
Total Installed 
Capacity (MW) 
Kremasta 
Aheloos 
437 
Kastraki 320 
Stratos 150 
Polyfito 
Aliakmon 
375 
Sfikia 315 
Asomata 108 
Aoos Springs 
Araxthos 
210 
Pournari I 300 
Pournari II 34 
Thisavros 
Nestos 
384 
Platanovrisi 116 
Ladonas Ladon 70 
Plastiras Tavropos 130 
 
 
 
2.2 Regulatory Market Reforms RMRs  
Because one of the main targets of this work is the detection of the impacts of the various 
reforms made, until today, by the Regulator on the SMP, we consider necessary a small 
description of these reforms as this will help a lot in understanding the usefulness of the 
modeling results of this work. The reforms took place on specific dates -milestones or 
Reference Dates, within the aforementioned transitional phases. Regulator’s National reports 
to EU (RAE, 2009,2010,2011) as well as other texts of the ADMIE and the work of Kalantzis 
et.al. mentioned above, are the main sources of this brief description. 
However, in all the previously referred official reports of the regulator regarding the prevailing 
market conditions, it is a spread evidence that GEM exhibits significant structural distortions 
and weaknesses that influence negatively its efficiency. These frictions are responsible for the 
lack of real competitiveness in the market. As an example, Regulator has repeatedly pointed out 
in reports the need for measures to constraint the excessive market power of the dominant 
player in the market, PPC. The regulator considers that PPC behaves completely differently 
than the other rivals due to the fact that it has a unique  energy mixture,(consisting of Lignite 
and Hydropower Stations that the other do not allow to have. This according to the regulator 
and other players creates an asymmetry in the market and subsequently frictions impairing 
efficiency. 
 
More specifically, some of the measures taken by RAE  towards avoiding abuses  by PPC, are the 
transparency of information, Techno-economic declarations of generation units, periodical 
Hydro Usage declarations, Unit Availability declarations, Price Caps and Price floors (RAE, 
2010). Given the fact that in general and in particular in GEM  Hydro Generation  has a crucial 
impact on the formation of SMP,  RAE requested PPC to publish 12-month rolling estimates of 
mandatory hydro, reservoir inflows and storage levels and historical annual curves. Through 
this measure, RAE’s purpose is to make possible deviations, between target and actual levels in 
inflows and storage, more clear and amenable to potential corrections. A measure that also 
gives to the traders the ability to adjust their positions in response to the published hydro 
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schedules is the obligation of PPC to publish those schedules prior to the closure of the auctions 
for interconnection.   
1st Reference Day (1.10.2005) (RMR1). The 1st Reference Day (01.10.2005) marked the 
beginning of a market-based operation of the system, with the System Operator dispatching 
units according to an offer based unit commitment and the SMP calculation to be based on 
offers instead of costs.A price floor was set (it is still in place) to the offers, corresponding to 
each Unit´s minimum variable cost, in an effort to prevent the incumbent (dominant player 
generating) from bidding below this value. This reform in combination with the entrance in the 
market of a new IPP (ENTHES), was expected to have a positive effect (increase) on the 
evolution of SMP. To facilitate the dispatching of Units, based on at least their technical 
minimum, the price floor was not applied to the first 30%  of the offered quality (rule of 30%). 
2nd Reference Day (1.1.2006) (RMR2). The Capacity Adequacy Mechanism, CAM, aiming to 
the partial recovery of capital costs, forces Suppliers to buy capacity certificates from 
generators. In November 2010, until now, the value was set to 45000€/MWh/year, in an effort 
to mediate the effect of low demand on the revenues of generators. CAM has created incentives 
for new investments, inducing as almost 2000 MW of new IPP gas-fired capacity to be added to 
the system by the end of 2011.CAM, has an effect on SMP depending on the degree of maturity 
of the market (Stoft S., 2002) If the market is mature this mechanism is expected to have no 
effect on the dynamics of SMP. The third Regulatory Market Reform, RMR3, was a result 
caused by an almost continuous pressure by market agents to change the methodology of 
estimating SMP. In addition to this, there were also expressed complaints by market players for 
the operations of the System Operator regarding the dispatching of a number of Units, at all 
times, for security reasons, some of them functioning at their technical minimum. A new 
methodology was adopted aiming in changing the artificially low SMP determined due to the 
above mentioned reasons, causing the agents to complaint, in which technical minimum were 
not considered, therefore approaching to a pure economic dispatch. An increase in SMP was 
expected due to this reform. RMR4 regards the change from daily to hourly submission of 
generator offers, starting on 4th April 2007. According to this reform each generator could 
submit for each trading day and for each hour, a different bid of higher value for peak hours and 
low for off-peak ones. The SMP was expected not to be affected by this reform. 
3rd Reference Day (1.5.2008) (RMR5).  Cost Recovery Mechanism, CRM5, was considered 
by the Regulator a necessary step until the Imbalance Settlement Mechanism, ISM 
(scheduled for the 5th  Reference Day). CRM states that if the SMP is lower than the marginal 
cost of generating Unit (plus 10%), then the Unit will receive the difference as a compensation. 
The Regulator expected that this Reform would have no effect on SMP. CRM was aiming to 
ensure that generators will be compensated at least their marginal cost, in case they were 
ordered to operate.  
4th Reference Day (1.1.2009) (RMR6). The 4th Reference Day (01.01.2009) focused on the 
change of the ex-post SMP calculation methodology according to the unit commitment 
algorithm that considers all technical constraints of the units and the reserve requirements of 
the ADMIE (ex HTSO) expecting to lead to lower SMPs.   
5th Reference Day (30.9.2010) (RMR7). The 5th Reference Day (30.09.2010) initiated the 
mandatory day-ahead market model and introduced the Imbalances Settlement Mechanism 
                                                          
5
 This mechanism, currently in use, provides an explicit compensation for the commitment costs incurred as a 
result of the market situation (generation scheduling) as well as additional payments so the Unit ends up with 
a profit equal to 10% of its variable cost, if  the market revenues for energy (taking into account both DA and 
IS markets)  is not capable of generating  a reasonable profit (see also Andrianesis P., et.al , 2011). 
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retaining at the same time the SMP methodology allowing only the submission of demand 
declarations. RMR7 is referred to the adoption of an enhanced Unit commitment algorithm 
which co-optimize energy as well as ancillary services. In this new mandatory, Day-Ahead 
market model incorporating, at the same time, an Imbalance settlement mechanism6, market 
clearance is now based on the non- priced demand declarations (previously the HTSO forecasts 
were used instead). Taking into account that the methodology for estimating SMP retained the 
same and the fact that usually the declared demands were underestimated, the effect of this 
reform expected to reduce SMP slightly. RMR8 regards the decision of the Ministry of Finance 
(1.9.2011) to impose a new tax levy on natural gas, equal to 1.50€/GJ (applied also to electricity 
generation). As SMP was set, for the majority of trading periods, by Natural Gas fired Units, the 
resulted increased generation cost was expected to increase SMP (see section 6.1 for 
comments). At the final stage the “architecture” of the market consists of the following 
components: A Day-Ahead (DA) compulsory market, the Imbalances Settlement 
Mechanism, the Capacity Adequacy Mechanism, the Cost Recovery Mechanism and the 
Ancillary Services Market. GEM is supervised by the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) 
and is operated by the newly formed organizations, the Independent Power Transmission 
Operator (IPTO or ADMIE) and the Independent Market Operator (IMO or LAGIE). We provide  
a small description of these two bodies and a history of their formation process in the appendix 
2. Table 2.5 summarizes all the Regulatory Market Reforms taken towards a resolution of the 
distortions. In this table we provide the values of SMP and Load at the time of enactment of 
each reform, in order to monitor the evolution of SMP returns and their volatility, after the 
enactment.  The last two columns give RAE’s expectations of the impacts these reforms may 
have on SMP and  the actual, observed in practice  impacts  that also happened to be reassured 
by the modeling results of this paper. As we will see in a later section, for example, the Cost 
Recovery mechanism had actually a positive impact on the evolution of SMP, as it is shown in 
the last colum of Table 2.3, instead of an expected by the regulator neutral or uncertain one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 All imbalances – referring to the differences between the DAS (Day-Ahead-Schedule) and the real production or 
withdrawal of electricity – are settled through the Imbalance Settlement Mechanism. 
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Table 2.5: History of Regulatory Market Reforms (RMR) 
          
Regulatory 
Market 
Reform 
(RMR) 
Launching 
Date of RMR 
Description of the Regulatory 
Market Reform 
Values at time of 
Regulatory change 
Regulator’s 
expected 
Impact of 
RMR on SMP) 
Actual 
impact of 
the 
Reform 
SMP 
€/MWh 
Load  
MW   
RMR1 01.10.2005 
Adoption of mandatory pool (ex-
post settlement) 
63.12 5322 upward upward 
RMR2 01.01.2006 Capacity Adequacy Mechanism 27.46 4975 neutral 
 
neutral 
RMR3 13.01.2006 
1st Change of methodology for 
SMP calculation 
41.04 6839 upward 
 
upward 
RMR4 01.04.2007 Introduction of Hourly Bids 41.98 5292 neutral 
 
downward 
RMR5 01.05.2008 Cost Recovery Mechanism 42.02 4544 neutral upward 
RMR6 01.01.2009 
2nd Change of Methodology for 
SMP calculation 
47.97 5538 downward 
 
downward 
RMR7 30.09.2010 
DA market (mandatory) with 
imbalance settlement 
52.79 5532 downward 
 
upward 
RMR8 01.09.2011 
Introduction of Natural Gas 
Consumption Tax 
90.75 6509 upward 
 
upward 
 
3. Data Sets, Processing and Tests 
 
We have selected and analyzed daily data (average of 24 hourly data) on spot, Ex-post System - 
wide Marginal prices, SMP, and load (demand) of the Greek Electricity Market, taken from the 
official site of the Greek Independent Power Transmission Owner, IPTO, ADMIE S.A  
(www.admie.gr). The data set cover the period from 01.01.2004 to 31.12.2011, i.e. it contains 
2922 data corresponding to eight years. The market was less mature further back. Due to 
transformations needed for some variable (e.g Brent Oil data), the final length of the data set 
used in all calculations is 2877. We note that the SMP data for the period 01.01.2004 to 
30.09.2010 are ex-post adjusted values while from 01.10.2010 to 31.12.2011 are ex-ante.  
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution dynamics of SMP values.  An upward trend which drives the 
series is evident, causing an increase of  X% in the period 2004-11. Regular (weekly, quarterly) 
patterns can be seen, as well as some short-lived spikes and volatility clusters (although not 
easily distinguished). We clarify, at this point, the  characteristics of the chosen  series for 
analysis and modeling. 
 
During the transitory market regime (2004 – Sept. 2010), an indicative plant – commitment 
schedule was formed by the Day – Ahead market which also determine a SMP forecast as a 
reference spot price, working mainly as a price signal. However, the Cash – flows were based on 
Ex–post SMP prices which were the output of solving again the same cost – minimization 
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problem as in the case of Day – Ahead Schedule (DAS). This was possible by considering, in the 
solution process, the actual metered values of inputs as demand (load), plant availabilities, RES 
generation etc, and not DA forecasts. Then, Ex–post SMP prices were applied to the actual 
generation (reflecting largely the real – time dispatch orders of the TSO) and Consumption 
Volumes. Therefore, in the transitional period of GEM, Ex–post SMP used to settle the whole 
market.  After the RMR7 (30.09.2010), the new market design consists of two separate 
settlement processes: the DA market settlement (in which generators are paid and suppliers 
are charged according to volumes based on SMP and the plant schedules formed from DA 
dispatch i.e. from load declarations submitted, and the Settlement of Imbalances. In this 
settlement, deviations from DAS are charged or compensated (exogenous or TSO dispatch 
orders). In DA market a uniform pricing is still in place, which reflects the offer of the most 
expensive Unit dispatched, taking into Consideration the forecasted demand, plant technical 
constraints and the needs for reserve capacity.  Table 2.1a gives the summary statistics of the 
    Table 3.1a: Summary statistics of SMP_das and SMP_expost 
                          
 DAS EXPOST 
 Mean  56.35368  61.55577 
 Median  54.80146  59.81215 
 Maximum  117.9084  150.0000 
 Minimum  20.57900  20.37208 
 Std. Dev.  18.05566  19.24139 
 Skewness  0.442226  0.655339 
 Kurtosis  2.804380  3.824370 
   
 Jarque-Bera  87.38570  255.3301 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000 
   
 Sum  144040.0  157336.5 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  832947.1  945940.1 
   
Observations  2556  2556 
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Figure 3.1a Time histories of SMP Das and SMP ex-post, 2004-11. 
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Fig. 3.1b Box plot of SMP Das and Ex-post . 
 
two prices . Figures 3.1a ,b show the co-evolution dynamics and the distribution comparison.  
In the box plot, the values of the SMP ex-post distribution parameters (3rd quartile, mean, 
median and 1st quartile) are slightly higher than those of SMP-das. However the number of 
extreme or outlier values is larger and more extensively distributed in the case of SMP ex-post.   
 
As temperature is probably the most commonly used load predictor which in turn influences 
heavily SMP we examine the (linear) correlation coefficient between load and minimum, 
maximum temperature data from meteorological stations installed by NTUA, National 
Technical University of Athens. Table 2.1b shows daily max  and  min temperatures in 
Thessaloniki (the second largest city of Greece, in North) and  in Athens  (South). We observe 
that until 2009, North and South , load is correlated with min and max temperature almost the 
same. However, during the last two years 2010-2011, the correlation becomes more intense, 
both in two regions, while in 2011 in Athens we observe a greater correlation of load with min 
temperature indicating a more intense usage of AC for heating during winter due to a more 
expensive price of heating Oil and Nat Gas (a tax was imposed by the Government). The 
variation of Load with the daily average temperature in the country is shown in figure 3.2.  
 
Table 3.1b  Correlation coefficient between daily average Load and Temperature 
 
Time Period 
Correlation coefficient between daily average Load and Temperature 
THESSALONIKI ATHENS 
min temp. oC max temp. oC min temp. oC max temp. oC 
Full series 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.32 
2007 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 
15 
 
2008 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.18 
2009 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.19 
2010 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.48 
2011 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.44 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Load variation with average daily temperature in Greece. In the quadratic equation 
shown x is temperature and y Load. 
 
 
 
The graph shows a parabolic shape indicating increased consumption at high and low 
temperatures. It suggests also that forecasting future load (demand) requires the knowledge of 
load growth profile, relative to a certain reference i.e the current year. The polynomial function 
of load versus temperature shown on the graph seems a reasonable approximation for load 
forecasting. Due to quadratic and strong correlation between temperature and load, we have 
not included temperature as an exogenous – regressing variable in the modeling since its effect 
on SMP is sufficiently captured by the load variable. 
 
The data for Imports and Exports of Energy (in MWh) were taken from interconnection 
measurements (per interconnection point). The Generation Thermal Units availability data are 
daily final while for the availability of Hydro Units we considered their contractual values. 
The management of some missing values in the SMP spot price vector was done by using a 
combination of approaches like average of the neighboring observation for sporadic missing 
values. An overview of the data is given in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2: List of data set and name of Variable used in  Modeling. 
 
 Name of Data TS Description 
Length 
of Time 
Series 
Units of 
Measure  
Resolution 
Source 
Period 
Covered Daily 
Monthl
y 
1 
SMP ex-post or 
SMP 
Ex-post System 
Marginal Price 
(GEM Pool) 
 
2877 
€/MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
2 Load Load or Demand 2877 MW   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
3 Brent 
Brent Crude OIL 
Price  
2877 $/pbl 
 
See 
note 
 
ICE (Inter. 
Exchange, 
Blooberg 2004-
2012) 
2004-2011 
4 HydMR 
Hydro Production, 
must-run 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
5 HydGen Hydro Production 2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
6 Ahelenr 
Energy Reserves of  
Aheloos Dam 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
7 Aliakenr 
Energy Reserves of  
Aliakmon Dam 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
8 Araxthenr 
Energy Reserves of  
Arahthos Dam 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
8 Ladonenr 
Energy Reserves of  
Ladon Dam 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
10 Nestosenr 
Energy Reserves of  
Nestos Dam 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
11 Plastenr 
Energy Reserves of  
Plastiras  Dam 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
12 Hfog 
Heavy Fuel 
Generation 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
13 Resgen 
Renewables 
Generation 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
14 Ligng Lignite Generation 2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
15 Natgasg 
Natural Gas 
Generation 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
16 TotImports 
Total Imports of 
Energy 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
17 TotExports 
Total Exports of 
Energy 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
18 Uvail 
Generating Unit 
Availability 
2877 MWh   IPTO Data Base 2004-2011 
19 
MinTempNTUA 
MaxTempNTUA 
AvgTempNTUA 
Min, Max, 
MeanTemperature 
in Athens 
2877 oC   
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens, NTUA 
2004-2011 
         
 
 
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show the SMP (raw data) and load (demand) time histories. It is apparent  in 
fig. 3.3 that SMP exhibit a characteristic known as volatility clustering ,  that large changes and 
small changes tend to have their own clusters. The concept of volatility clustering is further 
explained in the sections that follow. 
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Figure 3.3.: Time history of the ex-post System Marginal price, SMP, of the Greek Electricity 
Market, 2004-2011. The arrows locate the dates of regulatory changes. 
            
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.: Time history of the daily, system-wide, load of the Greek electricity market 2004-
2011. 
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Table 3.3:  Summary statistics of SMP 
 
 
Table 3.3 gives the descriptive statistics of daily SMP. The positive skewness and kurtosis of the 
entire series indicate that the distribution of SMP has an asymmetric distribution with a longer 
tail on the right side, fat right tail. SMP is clearly non-normally distributed, as it is indicated by 
its skewness and excess kurtosis (>3) (normal distribution has kurtosis ≈3).  
Table 3.4 provides summary statistics for SMP and log SMP (the choice of this transformation is 
explained below) together with results from normality tests applied on the series, using the 
Jarque – Bera, JB algorithm (Jarque C.M. and A.K. Bera, 1987) of the null hypothesis that the 
sample SMP has a normal distribution. The test rejected the null hypothesis at the 1% 
significance levels, as it is shown in the table (p=0.000, JB Stat significant). As it is shown in a 
later section, SMP follows a distribution of fat tail, a   student’s t distribution.  
 
Table 2.4  Comparing summary statistics of SMP and log SMP 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 
Min 
Euro/Mwh 
Max 
Euro/Mwh 
Mean 
Euro/Mwh 
Std Deviation 
Euro/Mwh 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
(a Volatility 
proxy) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Inter 
Quartile 
Range 
Euro/Mwh 
2004 16.97 45.19 30.00 5.22 0.17 -0.1578 2.614 7.22 
2005 20.37 80.16 43.13 11.97 0.28 0.5246 2.986 15.66 
2006 26.91 81.19 64.13 12.06 0.19 -0.8428 3.5010 18.91 
2007 33.82 84.97 64.94 9.27 0.14 -0.6681 3.3435 12.93 
2008 30.92 124.35 87.23 14.23 0.16 -0.4520 3.999 19.12 
2009 29.19 73.66 47.39 9.67 0.20 0.3630 2.7483 12.91 
2010 29.42 83.12 52.25 10.51 0.20 0.1783 2.4992 15.07 
2011 35.94 150 71.70 20.11 0.28 1.4048 5.800 23.07 
 2004-2011                16.97 150 57.00 20.36 0.36 0.540 3.464 30.25 
 SMP LOG(SMP) 
 Mean  56.98370  3.975591 
 Median  56.07000  4.026601 
 Maximum  150.0000  5.010635 
 Minimum  16.97000  2.831447 
 Std. Dev.  20.36816  0.375986 
 Skewness  0.540037 -0.371518 
 Kurtosis  3.464248  2.650906 
   
 Jarque-Bera  165.6774  80.79185 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000 
   
 Sum  163942.1  11437.77 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1193142.  406.5675 
   
 Observations  2877  2877 
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In figures 3.3  the SMP   exhibits  also,  besides volatility clustering, the typical features of mean 
reversion and spikes,  a  tendency of the data to fluctuate around a long-term stable state or 
equilibrium,  as well as extremely high values of short duration  (spikes). Figure 3.5 shows the 
quantile-quantile plot of SMP against a theoretical normal distribution, In case the empirical 
and assumed theoretical distributions are the same, the q-q plot should be a straight line. The 
deviation of SMP from normality is apparent in the q-q plot. We see that the empirical quantiles 
(blue curve) versus the quantiles of the normal distribution (red line) do not coincide, even 
slightly, and exhibit extreme right and left tails: the maximum for SMP data is a multiple of 4.8 
of the standard deviation, often far larger than the factor around 3.46 that the normal 
distribution suggests. The extreme right tails of SMP will be used later as a way of describing 
the spikes that are shown in the conditional volatility series. Summary statistics of all the 
exogenous quantitative explanatory variables, used in modeling process is given in the 
Appendix 3 of this paper.  
 
   
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5: Quantile – Quantile plot of ex-post SMP against the normal distribution 
 
 
 
3.3 Testing for stationarity of the SMP returns 
 
 We treat SMP as a stochastic process and before proceeding to further in our analysis, it is 
necessary to check the series for lack of stationary. Economic and Financial time series, due to 
the fact that they depend on exogenous factors, exhibit a non-stationary behavior (Brock A.W. 
and P.J.F. de Lima, 1995, Pagan A., 1996). However, it has been found that electricity market 
data are more stationary than all financial series, reported so far in empirical analyses (Strozzi 
F. et. al., 2002, Bunn 2004, Weron R., 2006). Augmented Dickey_Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) unit roots tests have been performed, for testing the null hypothesis that SMP has 
unit roots i.e is nonstationary. Table 2.5 lists the results. 
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Table  3.5  ADF and PP test for Normality. 
  Lag                           h                      p                 ADF  Stat          h                      p                    PP test 
0 1 0.000 -12.9068 1 0.000 -12.9068 
1 1 0.000 -10.4557 1 0.000 -11.9549 
2 1 0.000 -8.6783 1 0.000 -11.2853 
3 1 0.000 -7.6094 1 0.000 -10.9366 
4 1 0.000 -6.8322 1 0.000 -10.7832 
5 1 0.000 -5.9425 1 0.000 -10.6480 
6 1 0.000 -5.0524 1 0.000 -10.5460 
7 1 0.000 -5.6615 1 0.000 -10.8849 
 
 
The logical flag  h = 1 indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (critical Value for both tests is -
3.414 a value less than the Stats values above). Therefore SMP with high probability is 
covariance-stationary around a linear trend. Theodorou (Theodorou P., et. al,  2008,  Petrell et. 
al, 2012) have reported similar with us results using Dickey – Fuller (DF) and Kwiatkowsk – 
Phillips – Schmidt – Shin (KPSS) tests. Papaioannou G., et al. (1995) and Papaioannou G., 
(2013), have applied a nonlinear tool for stationarity detection in financial and electricity 
markets. 
 
ADF unit root tests reject the null hypothesis of the existence of this type of nonstationarity  for 
all Hydro Plants (energy reserves series) and the Brent oil one (ADF Stats > CriticalVal). 
Therefore, for these series we take first differences to make them stationary. SMP and all 
quantitative explanatory variables are not Normally distributed as the JB test suggests, so we 
log transform them to make them ‘more normal’ (JB Stats are reduced and become 
insignificant) (see Appendix 3 for test results). 
 
 
3.4 Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation functions 
 
Autocorrelation estimates of SMP and its returns are presented in this section. They signal the 
extent to which prices carry over from one day to the next. Arbitrage opportunities are 
associated with non-zero autocorrelations. 
 
In figure 3.6 we plot the ACF of the system marginal price for the period 2004-2011. We 
observe strong, persistence 7-day dependence and that the ACF decays very slowly. This 
indicates that SMP data contain a strong trend which is responsible for this positive and very 
slowly decreasing ACF. Brownian motion, commodity prices etc. behave similarly, yielding very 
slowly decaying ACF’s. However, these serial dependencies can be “destroyed” by taking 
differences in the data which is equivalent of taking the returns of the data. Since we are 
interested in revealing the impacts of exogenous variables (that exhibit both trend and 
periodicity) on SMP and since SMP series was found to be stationary we do not take differences 
of the series and let our proposed composite ARMAX/GARCH model to take care of these 
dependencies.  
 
We have also calculated ACF and PACF (not shown here)  of SMP returns and square returns (a 
proxy for variance) in which we see also that there is a strong, persistent of one-, two-, seven- 
and 14-day dependency in contrast to most financial data for which ACF of returns dies out 
quickly to zero after the first lag or after 5-10 lags (e.g. days) and long-term autocorrelations 
are observed only for squared returns (results are not included here due to space limitation). 
While the existence of such large autocorrelations indicates lack of market efficiency, the 
inherent characteristic of non-storability of electricity does not allow traders to take advantage 
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for profits from such day-to-day dependence. The one- and two-day autocorrelations are due to 
the timing of bids. For example, bids for tomorrow delivery must be submitted today. So, the 
information set available at the time tomorrow’s bids are submitted, includes yesterday’s 
information but not today’s one, therefore a two-day lag autocorrelation. Also, electricity 
demand varies from Sunday to Monday, and this variation is almost the same. The expected 
day-of-the-week effects observed in all electricity markets explain the 7- and 14-day lags in the 
ACF.  
 
 
Fig. 3.6 :  Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation function of SMP (2004-2011) 
 
The results obtained in figure 3.6 are useful in model specification for the conditional mean. A 
quantification of the correlation existence is possible by using a formal hypothesis test, the 
Ljung-Box-Pierce Q-test for a departure from randomness based on the ACF and PACF on SMP.  
It is known that the Q-test is most often used as a post-estimation lack-of-fit test applied to the 
fitted innovations (residuals)(see below). We have applied the above test using seven lags 
(weekly dependence) to test the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, under which the Q-test 
statistics is asymptotically x2 distributed.  
 
Table 3.6 Lung-Box-Pierce Q-test results on SMP 
 
lag ACF PACF Q-Stat prob 
1 0.907 0.907 2366.9 0.000 
2  0.854 0.183 4469.9 0.000 
3 0.828 0.168 6443.5 0.000 
4 0.809 0.118 8332.5 0.000 
5 0.797 0.099 10162 0.000 
6 0.795 0.134 11985 0.000 
7 0.802 0.152 13843 0.000 
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Based on the results, the null of zero serial correlation is rejected at the 99% significance level. 
We have also implemented Engle’s test to test for the presence of ARCH effects. Under the null 
hypothesis that a time series is a random sequence of Gaussian disturbances (i.e. no ARCH 
effect exist), this test statistics is also asymptotically x2 distributed. This test too rejected the 
null hypothesis that there are no significant GARCH effects (the results are not shown here). As 
a conclusion, the SMP series exhibit both significant correlations and GARCH effect or 
heteroskedasticity. This enhances our decision to apply a GARCH model for conditional 
volatility and its associated stylized effects. 
Therefore, we are sure with a high certainty that the SMP series is covariance-stationary 
around a linear trend. Our result is in line with other previous works on electricity prices 
(Petrella, et. al,2012, Bunn, 2004, Werron, 2006). However, since we have found that SMP is not 
normally distributed we just take the log of the series to make it ‘more normal’ (actually the 
Jarue-Bera statistics see table 2.4 is  reduced from 165.7 to 80.7).  
Thus, based on these results, our models for conditional mean and volatility will be specified in 
log levels, that is we take log-transform and no differences. We expect that the linear trend 
mentioned before, may be nothing but a proxy for the underline trend in a fundamental factor 
as for example fuel prices. In fact, looking at the correlation table, between SMP and exogenous 
variables in Appendix 4  and the following figure  3.7 showing the Price Index changes in 2002-
2009, one can expect that the linear trend may come from Nat Gas prices (correlation 
coefficient 0.57), Brent price (corr. Coef. 0.62) and load demand (corr. Coeff. 0.40). The 
conditional mean equation described below will give as a more certain answer for the linear 
trend, around which the SMP is covariance-stationary, 
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Figure 3.7 Price Index dynamics of SMP and Fuels (source :FEIR report 20107) 
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 Foundation for Economic & industrial Research (IOBE), report 2010. 
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4 Modeling conditional mean and Unconditional (Historic) and Conditional  
Volatility of SMP 
 
Historical or statistical volatility, HV, looks backward i.e. it is based on past return values, 
unlike implied volatility which is a concept used in the option pricing theory, giving an 
estimation for the future volatility. HV is simply the annualized standard deviation, St.dev, of 
past or historical returns. HV or retrospective volatility index therefore captures the amplitude 
of price movements for a given period of time in the past. All typical risk theoretical models that 
rely on the notion of standard deviation generally assume that return conform to a normal bell-
shaped distribution. In that case, therefore, we can expect that about two-thirds of the time 
(68,3%), asset returns should fall within one st.dev (+-) while 95% of the time they should fall 
within two st.dev. Qualitatively normal distributions exhibit skinny “tails” and perfect 
symmetry. Using the rolling volatility method we estimate a rolling standard deviation i.e. the 
st.dev of returns measured over a subsample which moves forward through time, thus 
estimating volatility at each point in time. It is assumed implicitly in this approach that 
volatility is constant over the time interval corresponding to the chosen subsample. This 
method provides accurate values of st.dev, when we are interested in point estimation, and 
assumes also that returns follow a geometric Brownian motion (Merton, R., 1980). 
 
However the assumption of constant volatility over some period is both statistically inefficient 
and inconsistent, in estimating volatility. We handle this problem by building first parametric 
models for the time-varying st.dev and then extract volatility from return data generated by the 
model. The models described in section 10 below (of the GARCH-type) are used to give better 
estimates of volatility of SMP. 
 
The moving window approach or rolling volatility approach gives the volatility estimate at 
a given time tk (Weron R., 2006, Eydeland et al., 2003).                                                         
In figure 4.1 we show a 30-day and 90-day moving window or rolling volatility, for log SMP, for 
year 2011. A window of 30-day is also chosen in RAE’s reports, and compare this unconditional 
volatility with the conditional one generated by the ARMAX/GARCH model described below.  
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Dynamics of SMP ex-post for 2011(actual and 30-day and 90-day smoothed 
values by Exponential moving average of daily  data) (Source: ADMIE S.A). 
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Table 4.1: 30-Day, m=30, Annualized Volatility for ex-post SMP returns 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
 Volatility 
Annualized 
Volatility * 
Volatility 
Annualized 
Volatility 
Volatility 
Annualized 
Volatility 
Min 0.094 0.32 0.084 0.29 0.121 0.41 
Max 0.220 0.76 0.280 0.97 0.291 
 
1.01 
 
Mean 0.154 0.53 0.180 0.62 0.184 0.64 
std 0.026 0.09 0.037 0.13 0.039 0.13 
 
 
*Annualized volatility = σ *          where we assume 365 trading days in GEM and m is the length 
of moving window. 
 
 
However in the simple MA model, the moving averages are equally weighted (last day’s return 
is equally weighted with the returns one week ago). In this “historic” model and all variations 
are due only to the differences in samples, i.e. a short moving average window e.g. m=10 days 
will be more variable than an m=30 one. But no matter which m is used, a simple rolling 
volatility model estimates the unconditional volatility which is just one number, a constant, 
underlying the entire series. In this model the wrongly perceived time variation in volatility is 
in reality a sample variation and there is no stochasticity estimation. No dynamic evolution of 
returns is taken into account by this model. 
The equal weights on each return data are responsible for the appearance of “ghost features” in 
the volatility series. Therefore, instead of using a simple, rolling moving average model we use 
an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA)  that  eliminates the “ghost features”. A 
EWMA is written as follows: 
  
           
       
                                                        (4.1) 
where λ is a smoothing constant. The larger the value of λ the more weight is placed on past 
data, the more smoother the series becomes.  
Model (4.1) is used by JP Morgan-Reuter’s Risk MetricsTM (J.P Morgan/Reuters, 1996) 
extensively in estimating volatility in financial assets (for daily data λ=0.94 is used). A careful 
look on (4.3) shows that (4.1) is actually a model for the conditional volatility. In fact, model 
(4.1) applied on squared returns is equivalent to a non-stationary GARCH model (see formula 
4.7) IGARCH (Integrated GARCH), where k=0 and A1+G1=1. So, in order to compare the 
conditional volatility estimation by our best found ARMX/GARCH model, describe in section 6, 
with a “historic” EWMA model that also estimates conditional volatility, we construct an EWMA 
model which can produce as close as possible the behavior of our GARCH model.  We use 
λ=0.94, as it is suggested by Risk MetricsTM  (Risk MetricsTM , 1996), in the technical document, 
equal to the persistence coefficient G1, (the moving window length or lagged time period in 
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EWMA is 77 days for 1% tolerance level). The dynamics of the generated conditional volatility 
series matches extremely close the GARCH’s model dynamics, although differences in the levels 
is observed, as expected due to differences in model specification. 
Large G1 indicate that shocks to conditional variance take a long time to die out, so volatility is 
“persistent”. Large A1 mean that volatility is quick to react to market movements and volatilities 
show to be more “spiky”.  Even though there are differences in volatility values produced by the 
two models, their dynamic behavior is very similar (see fig. 4.7 for more details). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Conditional volatility estimated by EWMA model (λ=0.94) 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the conditional correlation between SMP and load , the most significant driver 
of the volatility of SMP as the table of the coefficients of the fitted model shows. A very 
interesting point here is that the conditional co-movement of these two variables, reflected 
through their conditional correlation is gradually reduced after 2008, the year of the country’s 
recession starts.   
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Figure 4.4 Conditional correlation between load (demand) and SMP estimated by EWMA model. 
 
 
 
 
4.4 ARMAX/GARCH  time Series Models for  SMP  
 
Volatility forecast models of the GARCH family are in general use. ARCH (Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity) of Engle (Engle R.F., 1982)  was the first model but the 
generalized ARCH or GARCH  (Bollerslev T., 1986)  is the common denominator for most 
volatility models. Let’s symbolize System Marginal Price,  SMP by Pt .   We take the logPt as the 
only transformation. We treat Pt as a stochastic process exhibiting a degree of correlation from 
one measurement to the next. We can exploitate this correlation structure found in our data, to 
predict future values of the process based on the past history of observations. Exploitation of 
the correlation structure provides us with an opportunity to decomposing Pt ,  into the 
following components: a deterministic component or the forecast (a term used from now 
on), a random component (the error or uncertainty, related to the forecast). 
 
So, the general expression of the model for logPt   is: 
 
                                                                       logPt = f(t-1,X)+εt                                                                                                         (4.2) 
 
where f(t-1,X) is a nonlinear function representing the forecast or deterministic component, of 
the current price as a function of the information set available at time t-1, Ψt-1. The forecast 
may consists of past disturbances { εt-1, εt-2, ….}, past observations { Pt-1, Pt-2 , ….}, and any other 
relevant explanatory time series data X (e.g. Load, Temperature, fuel prices etc.). { εt} is a 
random innovation process, representing disturbances in the mean of { Pt }, but εt can also be 
interpreted as the one step ahead or the single-period-ahead forecast error, since from (4.2) we 
have  
                                                            εt= Pt - f(t-1,X) 
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It is also assumed in this study that the innovations εt  are random disturbances with zero mean 
and uncorrelated from one time step to the other, i.e. E{εt}=0,  E{εt1 εt2}=0,  t1≠t2 . 
 
Although εt are uncorrelated they are not independent but successive values depend on each 
other as in case of a generating rule εt  
 
                                                                                                                      (4.3) 
 
where σt is the conditional standard deviation and zt is a standardized, independent, 
identically-distributed (iid) random sample generated by a Normal or Student’s t probability 
distribution. 
 
Equation (4.3) says that {εt} rescales an iid process {zt} with a conditional standard 
deviation, σt, that includes the serial dependence of the innovations. This means that the 
quantity, εt/σt, the standardized disturbance, is also iid. 
 
It is well known from finance theory that GARCH models are consistent with the concept of 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH), according to which observed past returns cannot improve 
the forecasts of future returns (Campbell Y.J., et.al, 1997). Therefore, GARCH innovations { εt } 
are serially uncorrelated. 
4.4.1 Conditional Mean Models 
 
Since we are interested in modeling the impacts of a variety of explanatory variables on SMP , 
both of a “fundamental” type of relation to SMP (e.g. load, fuel prices, type of generation etc.) 
and of “external” type (the regulator’s changes or policies), we adopt an ARMAX model for the 
conditional mean, as given in (4.4) 
 
 
The expression for the nonlinear function f(t-1,X) can take the general form of an ARMAX(R, M, 
Nx) model for the conditional mean: 
                                     
  
   
 
   
 
   
                                           
 
where φi the autoregressive coefficients, θj the moving average coefficients, εt innovations (or 
residuals) a zero-mean white noise process with variance σ2, εt WN (0, σ2). X(t,k) is an 
explanatory regression matrix of k variables. R, M are the orders of the Autoregressive and 
Moving average polynomials and Nx the number of explanatory variables in the matrix X. 
 
  
4.4.2 Conditional Variance Models 
 
The conditional variance of innovations is given below: 
 
Vart-1(logPt) = Et-1(εt2) =  σt2                                                        (4.5) 
 
We must point out here the distinction between the conditional and unconditional variances 
of {εt}. Conditional variance implies explicit dependence on a past series of observations. 
Unconditional refers to long-term evolution of a time series and assumes no explicit 
knowledge of past observations. 
 
εt = σt zt 
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Following a similar approach with Lo and Wu (Lo K.L. and Y.K. Wu, 2004), let εt a real-valued 
discrete-time stochastic process, ψt-1 the information set of all information through time t-1, 
and σt2 the conditional variance. The general GARCH (P,Q) model for conditional variance of 
innovation is 
                Εt |ψt-1 ~ N(0,σ2t)                                                           (4.6a) 
 
                              
           
  
         
 
        
                                         (4.6b) 
 
where   k>0,   Gi≥0   and   Aj≥0 
 
This is a symmetric variance process i.e. it does not take into account the sign of the 
disturbance. 
 
Gi is a key persistence parameter of which high value implies a high impact of past volatility 
to future volatility, while a low value implies a lower dependence on past volatility. Volatility is 
said to be persistent if today’s return has a large effect on the future or forecasted variance 
many, say, days ahead. This is equivalent in saying that periods of high and low volatility tend 
to be grouped or clustered. The significance of Gi will be shown in section 10.1.6 below. 
 
When P=Q=1 in (4.6b) we get the GARCH(1,1) model, and for R=M=0 and no explanatory Matrix 
X , we have a constant mean equation (f(t-1)constant) and normally distributed innovations. 
This simple model has been shown to capture the volatility in most of financial returns (see Lo 
et. al, 2004 and references in it). We used this model in this work to test if it can do the job in 
SMP series.    
 
                                                             εt |ψt-1 ~ N(0,σ2t)                                                                         (4.7a) 
                                                               logPt   =  c+εt                                                                              (4.7b) 
                                 σ2t= k + G1σ2t-1+A1ε2t-1                                                                      (4.7c) 
 
Generally, this model satisfies the stylized facts of persistence (or clustering) and mean 
reverting. G1 + A1 is a point estimate of persistence, i.e. the time taken for volatility to move 
halfway back to its unconditional mean value following a given perturbation. If G1 + A1 <1 then 
we have a mean reverting conditional volatility mechanism in which perturbations or shocks 
are transitory in nature. The closest this parameter is to unity the slower the shocks to SMP 
volatility die out. The number of days for volatility to return or revert half-way back to its mean 
is given as ln(1/2) / ln(G1 + A1). We have calculated this half-life parameter as described 
below. The asymptotic relationship of the unconditional σ2 with the conditional one given by 
(4.7c)  is     =
 
       
 . 
 
The logPt series, in (4.7), consists of a constant plus an uncorrelated white noise disturbance εt.  
The variance forecast, σ2t-1, is the sum of a constant k plus a weighted average of last period’s 
forecast and last period’s squared disturbance. As we have seen in section 2, the logPt, exhibit 
significant correlation and persistence. Thus, our data for logPt is a candidate for GARCH 
modeling and we have already mentioned that exhibit volatility clustering. We will investigate 
whether the innovations of the fitted model to the logPt have an asymmetric impact on the 
price volatility. It is rational to expect that positive shocks to SMP increase volatility more than 
negative shocks. This rationality stems from the fact that an increase to SMP (a positive shock) 
corresponds, naturally, to say, an unexpected increase in demand for electricity. Furthermore, 
because marginal costs are convex, positive demand perturbations have a larger influence on 
price changes relative to negative perturbations. The above situation describes the leverage 
effect that we mentioned earlier and is captured in finance by the EGARCH model of Nelson 
(Nelson D.B., 1991). 
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One type of GARCH model useful in capturing the leverage effect (or asymmetric volatility 
effect) is the general EGARCH(P,Q) model, for the conditional variance of the innovations. 
 
     
        
 
          
     
 
    
      
    
    
      
    
      
 
    
    
    
                (4.8a)       
where 
              
      
    
    
 
 
    for normal distribution and              
      
    
    
   
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
for student’s t distribution with degrees of freedom v>2. Lj is the leverage term. 
 
For the EGARCH(1,1)  the Conditional Variance  equation  becomes  
 
         
              
       
      
    
  
 
 
    
    
    
                                                                (4.8b)                      
 
where L1 is the asymmetry parameter. We note also that the magnitude effect is measured 
by     
      
    
  
 
 
  and the sign effect is indicated by   
    
    
 . 
 
If L1 = 0, then there is no asymmetric effect of past shocks on current variance. 
If -1<L1<0 then a positive shock increases variance less than a negative shock.  
If L1<1 then positive shocks reduce variance while negative shocks increase variance.  
 
Parameter estimates for (4.8b) were found to be not significant, in our case. For this model 
(4.8a) the approximate relationship between the unconditional variance σ2, of the fitted 
innovations process, and the G1 parameter is  
 
     
 . 
 
Another model that is used for capturing the leverage effect is the general GJR(P,Q) and 
For P=Q=1 we have the GJR(1,1) with an equation for the conditional variance as follows  
 
 
                                               σ2=k+Α1ε2t-1+L1St-1ε2τ-1+G1σ2t-1                                                                      (4.8c) 
 
 
where st-1= 1 if εt-1<0 and 0 if εt-1≥0 
 
The variable st-1 is an indicator variable to account for the effect of positive shocks or good 
news (εt-1≥0) and the negative shocks or bad news (εt-1<0) in the market. Therefore, the effect 
on volatility of good news is A1 while in the case of bad news the effect is A1+L1. In this model 
also, K is positive and A1 nonnegative (to ensure a positive variance.  The EGARCH and GJR 
models are asymmetric ones that capture the leverage effect, or negative correlation, between 
rt and σ2t. This means that these models explicitly take into account the sign and magnitude of 
the εt, the innovation noise term. Therefore if the leverage effect does indeed hold, the leverage 
coefficients Lj should be negative for EGARCH models and positive for GJR.  The terms Gi and Ai 
capture volatility clustering in GARCH and GJR models while in EGARCH model volatility is 
captured only via Gi terms. 
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4.5 Model specifications, outputs and diagnostic tests 
 
We have tested a number of promising (composite) symmetric and asymmetric models in 
searching for the best one to capture successfully the stylized facts in model’s innovations. 
Table 4.2a show the results, the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC, BIC) and the 
Durbin-Watson statistic.  The model in (4.7) was found to be inappropriate (in replicating the 
dynamics of SMP) by using a combination of criteria for assessing model’s specification. Yet, 
this model can’t be used to detect the effects of fundamental and regulatory factors on SMP.  
 
 
Model 10 seems to be is the best of all  in the set of symmetric and  asymmetric models  since a 
combination of AIC and BIC criteria , DW and the ARCH test for detecting any remaining serial 
correlations in the residuals of the variance equation, are in favor of this model. Durbin – 
Watson (DW) statistics is used to analyze whether the residuals are clean, i.e. tests the 
hypothesis that there is no first-order autocorrelation or serial correlation apparent in the 
residuals. The residuals must be clean and have no structure. If 2<DW<4 then there is negative 
correlation in the residuals while for DW<2 positive correlation. As a rule of thumb, a DW of 
exactly 2 indicates clean residuals and any substantial deviation from this value indicates 1st 
order serial correlation in the residuals. Model 10 in table 4.2a, which is our best found model 
has DW=2.036 close to the perfect value so we can trust our model of not having first order 
serial correlations in the residuals. The existence of higher order serial correlation is detecting 
through ARCH test, and the correlograms of standardized residuals square (Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics), as described below. 
 
The specification of our best model 10 is therefore ARMAX(7,1,25)/GRCH(1,1). The complete 
form of the system of equation of the model is: 
 
conditional mean (equation (4.4)) 
 
 
       logPt = c + φ1 logPt-1   +  φ2 logPt-2 +....φ7 logPt-7  +θ1εt-1 + β1Χ(t,1) + β2Χ(t,2) +……+  β25 Χ(t,25)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    (4.9a) 
 
conditional variance                         
 =k+Α1ε2t-1+G1σ2t-1                                                            (4.9b) 
 
 
The results of fitting the model to our data are given in table 4.2a, where the values of the 
coefficients are provided. 
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    Table 4.2a: Assessment of model specifications by applying AIC ARCH test 
 
 
  
 
Note*:  leverage effect coefficient found to be non-significant, see table 4.2b
Model 
Conditional 
Volatility 
equation 
Specification 
Number of 
Exogenous 
Regressors R-
squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Stat 
AIC HIC 
Hannan 
- Quinn 
ARCH-test   (for 
7 lags) 
ARCH 
TEST 
 (serial 
correlation 
remains in 
residuals 
Yes/No) 
mean 
equation 
variance 
equation 
Stat. 
p-
value 
0 symmetric 
ARMAX(0,0,0)/GARCH(1,1) 
Base model 
0 0 -0.097 0.189 0.409 0.417 0.412 
106.20
8 
0.0000 yes 
1 
symmetric 
ARMAX(1,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 0 0.916 1.818 -1.886 -1.820 -1.862 12.255 0.0925 no 
2 ARMAX(1,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 8 0.852 0.780 -1.415 -1.338 -1.387 41.441 0.0000 yes 
3 ARMAX(1,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 25 0.853 0.792 -1.432 -1.320 -1.392 48.093 0.0000 yes 
4 ARMAX(2,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 25 0.917 2.068 -1.966 -1.848 -1.924 31.912 0.0000 yes 
5 ARMAX(2,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 8 0.919 2.058 -1.932 -1.847 -1.901 26.674 0.0004 yes 
6 
asymmetric 
ARMAX(1,1,25)/GJR(1,1)* 25 25 0.851 0.790 -1.434 -1.320 -1.393 47.343 0.0000 yes 
7 ARMAX(2,1,25)/GJR(1,1)* 25 8 0.919 2.070 
-
1.9327 
-1.847 -1.901 26.712 0.0004 yes 
8 
ARMAX(2,1,25)/EGARCH(1,1
)* 
25 8 0.919 2.050 -1.930 -1.845 -1.899 30.658 0.0001 yes 
9 
symmetric 
ARMAX(7,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 25 0.918 2.074 -1.966 -1.835 -1.910 19.600 0.0065 No 
10 ARMAX(7,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) 25 8 0.921 2.036 -1.971 -1.878 -1.938 13.331 0.0644 no 
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Table 4.2b: Asymmetric model coefficient of leverage effect 
 
Model  L1 p-value 
6 0.1268 0.1385 
7 0.0843 0.3046 
8 -0.0048 0.8892 
 
 
Table 4.3 :  ΑRMAΧ(7,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) model  parameters 
 
Mean Equation 
     
Variable Coefficient Coeff. value Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
      C 
 
0.637868 0.449498 1.419068 0.1559
D(AHELENR) β1 -0.000071 0.000136 -0.529789 0.5963 
D(ALIAKENR) β2 -0.001604 0.000741 2.163641 0.0305 
D(ARAXTHENR) β3 -0.000245 0.000862 -0.284382 0.7761 
LOG(BRENT) β4 0.256842 0.077274 3.323766 0.0009 
LOG(HFOG) β5 0.005906 0.002383 2.477875 0.0132 
LOG(HYDGEN) β6 -0.052671 0.006899 -7.634190 0.0000 
LOG(HYDMR) β7 -0.028504 0.005643 -5.050850 0.0000 
D(LADONENR) β8 -0.003870 0.002852 -1.357035 0.1748 
LOG(LIGNG) β9 -0.336946 0.025724 -13.09859 0.0000 
LOG(LOAD) β10 1.558140 0.031401 49.62039 0.0000 
LOG(NATGASG) β11 0.047442 0.007023 6.755063 0.0000 
D(NESTOSENR) β12 0.002768 0.001042 2.655939 0.0079 
D(PLASTENR) β13 -0.005011 0.001603 -3.124855 0.0018 
LOG(RESGEN) β14 -0.033070 0.002008 -16.47227 0.0000 
LOG(TOTEXPORTS)   β15 0.023108 0.002264 10.20810 0.0000 
LOG(TOTIMPORTS) β16 -0.127141 0.010479 -12.13301 0.0000 
LOG(UAVAI) β17 -0.714757 0.032649 -21.89196 0.0000 
RΜR1 β18 0.176995 0.094799 1.867053 0.0619 
RΜR2 β19 0.161638 0.099196 1.629483 0.1032 
RMR3 β20 0.234799 0.106144 2.212081 0.0270 
RMR4 β21 -0.151792 0.025032 -6.063320 0.0000 
RMR5 β22 0.262312 0.044900 5.842120 0.0000 
RMR6 β23 -0.364146 0.041763 -8.724973 0.0000 
RMR7 β24 0.107159 0.045132 2.374328 0.0176 
RMR8 β25 0.130810 0.103499 1.63875 0.2063 
AR(1) φ1 0.236197 0.140190 1.684830 0.0920 
AR(2) φ2 0.203822 0.070729 2.881717 0.0040 
AR(3) φ3 0.088161 0.025150 3.505458 0.0005 
AR(4) φ4 0.078068 0.023089 3.381118 0.0007 
AR(5) φ5 0.087547 0.021817 4.012843 0.0001 
AR(6) φ6 0.069808 0.022847 3.055447 0.0022 
AR(7) φ7 0.139523 0.020427 6.830459 0.0000 
MA(1) θ1 0.241577 0.141563 1.706500 0.0879 
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Variance Equation 
      K 
 
0.001466 0.000330 4.440105 0.0000
RESID(-1)^2 A1 0.134847 0.020387 6.614217 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) G1 0.787272 0.026990 29.16894 0.0000 
RMR1 
 
0.000512 0.000530 0.096472 0.9231 
RMR2 
 
0.000942 0.003153 0.298736 0.7651 
RMR3 
 
-0.002166 0.003153 -0.690960 0.4896 
RMR4 
 
8.27E-06 7.21E-05 0.114690 0.9087 
RMR5 
 
0.000237 0.000135 1.755964 0.0791 
RMR6 
 
0.000411 0.000199 2.063805 0.0390 
RMR7 
 
0.000356 0.000279 1.275853 0.2020 
RMR8 
 
0.000619 0.000823 0.752420 0.4518 
     
R-squared 0.921336     Mean dependent var  3.977355 
Adjusted R-squared 0.920421 S.D. dependent var   0.374881 
S.E. of regression 0.105753 Akaike info criterion -1.971799 
Sum squared resid 31.70594 Schwarz criterion -1.878290 
Log likelihood 2873.546 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.938088 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.036971    
     
Therefore, the conditional variance equation becomes:  
 
 
         σ2t =0.0011 + 0.134ε2t-1 +  0.787σ2t-1                                        (4.10) 
 
 
If we interpret G1 and A1 as weights, A1 indicates that a weight of 13.4% is assigned to the most 
recent observation. (4.10) clearly shows that volatility is time varying, responding to the most 
recent data value of SMP. A weight of 79% is attached to the volatility estimate of yesterday. 
 
The persistence parameter is given by                  i.e. the model is covariance 
stationary. This parameter shows also the existence of a volatility clustering or mean 
reverting behavior of the SMPep. The Half-life parameter is H=ln(1/2)/ln(G1+A1)=9 days, 
meaning that it takes on average 9 days for half of the volatility shock to fade out. 
 
We have to mention here that a formal leverage effect as opposed to inverse leverage effect as 
Knittel and Roberts (2005) and Karakatsani and Bunn (Karakatsani N., et.al., 2004) have 
reported in their work, where a positive shock will increase the volatility more than a negative 
one. Our finding is that we do not have any leverage effect since the corresponding coefficients 
L in the asymmetric model fitting were found to be not significant. The result, however, 
reported in the work of Gianfreda (2010) for French, German, Italian and Spanish markets, 
using an EGARCH(1,1) model, and in the work of Montero et. al (2011) has shown the existence 
of such leverage effects.  
 
 
The final value of the conditional st.dev or volatility σt (see fig.4.8), is 0.133. We compare this 
value to the unconditional standard deviation σ, estimated by the model’s parameters as 
follows: 
 
    
 
       
  
      
             
       
 
Therefore, the long-term behavior of σt forecasts tends to the unconditional volatility of 0.133 
given by using the parameters of the estimated model.  
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Figure 4.6 shows the actual, fitted and residuals (innovations) values of model (4.10) while 
figure 4.7 depicts the Conditional Variance generated by the same model. On the same figure we 
provide the dates the regulatory reforms took place, so we can see the spikes or shocks they 
have induced on the conditional volatility of SMP, as the coefficients in mean and variance 
equations associated with these dummy variables (reforms) reveal in table 4.3.    
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Figure 4.6 :  ARMAX(7,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) fitting results. Plot of  actual, fitted and residuals 
(innovations). 
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Figure 4.7 Phases of evolution of Conditional volatility of log SMP and dates of RMRs.  
 
The most tranquil phase of the market, in terms of volatility, is from May 2006 to April 2008. 
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This calmness, however, is broken due to (among other factors) reform 4, generating the 
second significant spike in this period. The end of this tranquillity comes when reform RMR5 is 
launched in May 2008, responsible for a high spike taking the volatility from a value of 5% to 
22.5% , to drop again to the previous value after a month, passing first through the 
unconditional value of σ=13% (the long-term mean value), the volatility Shock having lost half 
of its intensity in almost 10 days (half-life was estimated to be 10 days). After the launching of 
RMR5, a phase of upward systematic escalation of the conditional volatility begins, with 
relatively small (compared to the previous spikes) spikes due to reforms 6 and 7. RMR8 gives 
the last spike shown but this can’t be attributed to this reform due to the fact that the 
coefficient found is insignificant.  In this escalation period the conditional volatility is increased 
from 5% to 13.5% (170%). 
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Figure 4.8: % Comparing dynamics of Conditional Volatility estimated by 
ARMAX(7,1,25)/GARCH(1,1) and EWMA models.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the comparison of the forecasted conditional volatility of the GARCH model, 
versus the conditional volatility estimated EWMA. This comparison serves as an indication of 
the model’s ability to track the variations in the GEM’s volatility. The asymptotic behaviors of 
the two models forecasts approach a long-term value of 13.4% (the last value red curve) while 
and 15.3% for the blue curve. Both models exhibit almost the same dynamic behavior , however 
EWMA model show instantaneous values always larger than GARCH due to differences in A1 
(GARCH) and λ-1= A1 (for EWMA) parameters. 
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Figure 4.8 Autocorrelation and Partial autocorr. Functions Of standardized squared 
                 Residuals of model (4.9). 
 
 
Any successful GARCH model is that one in which there is no autocorrelation in the squared 
standardized returns εt2/σt2, meaning that the model is capable of capturing volatility 
clustering in the original returns. Volatility clustering implies a strong autocorrelation in 
squared returns. 
 
From fig. 4.8 we see that the standardized squared residuals show no correlations (compare 
with ACF and PACF of SMP in fig. 3.6 before fitting the model). Therefore, our fitted model 
sufficiently explains heteroskedasticity behavior in our data.  
 
Furthermore, we repeated ARCH-test on these innovations (Table 4.4) and compared the 
results with those in the pre-estimation analysis. In the pre-estimation analysis the test 
indicated the existence of both correlations and heteroskedasticity. In the post-estimation 
analysis, ARCH-test now indicates acceptance of the respective null hypothesis that no ARCH 
effect exists, up to lags seven. This result further enhances the explanatory power of the fitted 
model. The ARCH test statistics was found to be 13.33 and insignificant (p=0.0643) for seven 
lags (all coefficients at lags 1 to 7 are insignificant. So no ARCH effects exist in the innovations 
of the fitted model. 
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Figure 4.9 Q-Q plot of model’s residuals vs the Student’s-t distribution.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the result of fitting the residuals generated by the model on the theoretical 
Student’s-t distribution that we have chosen to be the distribution of errors in specifying the 
GARCH(1,1) model. We see a very good fit of the residuals since the largest amount of data 
are on the theoretical line, except the extreme right,  positive values that deviate from the line, 
forming a fat tail of the distribution of the residuals. This fitting of good quality is also an extra 
evidence that our model has been correctly specified. Using now our best model (4.9,4.10) we 
perform in-sample or static SMP forecasts  as shown in  figure 4.10 , the dynamics of which 
mimics very well the dynamics of the actual series in fig. 3.3. The quality of the fit is also very 
good: Theil’s coefficient 0.045 , Bias (mean) and variance proportions small (0.003 and 0.022 
respectively). The descriptive statistics of the forecasted series are very close to the ones of the 
actual series (mean 57, max 147, min 20.3, st.dev 19.51, skewness 0.52,kurtosis 3.12), by 
comparing with the values in table3.3.  
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                 Figure 4.10 In-sample forecasts of SMP ex-post from best model  
 
In figures 7.2 and 7.3 we show the forecasting results of the model corresponding to two 
different scenarios for the evolution of the conditional variance with different starting times : 
the first in the tranquil, of low volatility phase, just before the application of RMR5 (end of April 
2008) , while the second in a high volatility regime, namely on 4th May 2008 three days after the 
enactment of RMR5. In the first case the long-term stable value of unconditional variance is 
approached from below while in the second case from above. These two scenarios confirm the 
quality of the model in generating rational and consistent dynamic behavior  of the conditional 
volatility. 
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Figure 4.11 Conditional Variance evolution of SMP from end of April 2008 to end of September 
2008. 
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Figure 4.12 Conditional variance evolution of SMP from 4th May 2008 to 30 June 2008. 
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5.  Interpreting the results  
 
The mean equation 
Referring to table 4.2b with parameter estimates of the Best Specified model 10, suggests that 
our time series model confirms the sign and intensity of the effects of fundamental variables on 
SMP as it is shown in a typical fundamental analysis.   
All the quantitative fundamental variables, the autoregressive and moving average structures 
are robust to controlling for regulatory changes in the GEM’s structure. Specifically, both the 
signs and the values of the coefficients of the fundamental factors remain unchanged before and 
after the inclusion of RMRs in the model specification. 
we observe that hydro generation, both for must-run and for “normal” functioning, have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the evolution of SMP. The effect however of the 
Hydgen factor is stronger than that of the hydmr (hydro must-run), as the values of the 
estimated coefficient indicate. This is a logical result as the amount of hydro must-run 
generated energy is a small part and is included in the series of the total hydro generation 
(hydgen),  used more intensively during peak-hour according to DAS (day-ahead schedule).  
The scarcity of hydro generation in 2011 is, among other fundamental factors, responsible for 
the SMP increase in this year, reflecting the strong and negative correlation of hydrog or 
hydromr with SMP. Years 2009 and 2010 instead, were intensely wet, causing a downward 
force on SMP. However, the driest years were 2007 and 2008 exerting a significant negative 
‘pressure’ on SMP.  
The significantly reduced hydro generation in 2011 exerted an upward trend on SMP, mainly 
due to the need for substitution by more expensive energy (see the negative correlation 
coefficients of hydgen with the thermal generation factors, brent, hfog, ligng, and natgas). 
How much significant is the factor Hydrogen in the formation of SMP (through the level and 
allocation profile of hydro generation), is also shown from its contribution to the formation of 
SMP’s “by-product”, the retail margin. A conservative, for example, water management i.e. 
over-restrictive in particular time periods, can produce a reduction in retail margin, favoring in 
this way a market supplier that happened to have a reduced retail volume. Therefore a supplier 
in the retail market with large share and an ability to control hydro generation, as PPC in 
Greece, can have a crucial impact not only on SMP formation but also, in consequence, on the 
retail price. 
The control over hydro generation factors can be done by designing a new approach of 
managing hydro stations by considering aspects such as the opportunity cost of water, the cost 
of fuel mix substituted by water and by a close linking of the above factors to the level of 
reservoirs. 
A negative effect on SMP have also the production of RES (resgen) and Lignite (lignitegen) 
stations with different relative strengths as the values of their corresponding coefficients 
reveal. A careful examination of the evolution of the share of each type of generation in the total 
annual installed capacity as well as in the duel mix generation, as it is shown in Tables 2.1 and 
2.2, reveals that RES share generation is always less than that of hydro as well as Lignite 
stations over the period 2004-2011, for each year. 
The higher the production by lignite stations the lower the SMP, reflecting the impact of a low 
price input factor to the generating portfolio of the system. Negative, also, effect on SMP have 
the total emported energy (totimports) and the generating unit availability (Uavail). The 
factor has the next higher coefficient but now with a negative impact on SMP is Unit availability 
for (uavail) since an 1% increase in this variable, ceteris paribus, reduces 0.71% the value of   
SMP. Planned and unplanned outages for maintenance reduce availability. Unplanned outages 
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are stochastic events distributed uniformly over the year. Efforts are made so planned outages 
are scheduled to happen during periods of low load and low SMP.  The more available are the 
generating units the lower the SMP, since enough of the required capacity is readily available 
and according to the DA and dispatching schedules (the units have hardly competing each other 
to be included on the list for next day’s generation). More specifically Unit availability (uavail) 
depends on the level of outages and maintenance and is negatively related to SMP. For example, 
in the end of 2011 two severe outages in IPP’s plants and one in a Unit of PPC (Lavrio5) induced 
these Units unavailable for long periods of time.  The induced, due to this fact cuts in demand, 
exerted an upward pressure on SMP. During June of the same year a labor Union strike at PPC 
caused a major capacity withholding i.e. forced power cuts, reducing availability in 20 
generating Units which in turn had an extremely strong upward escalation of SMP (the price 
escalated from 42 €/MW in 19.06.2011 to the price cap (an administratively set price)  of 150 
€/MW in 24.06.2011 and finally to 148€/MW in 29.06.2011, being on average at 139.7 €/MWh 
for these ten days). 
Positive effect on SMP has the 3-month moving average of Brent Oil price (Brent) and the 
generation of Stations that use Heavy fuel Oil (Hfog), an expected result. The higher the values 
of these two variables, the higher the SMP. The energy production of Natural Gas (natgasg) 
Stations also have a positive influence on the behavior of SMP, as this type of fuel is an 
expensive production input.   The extent of natural  gas’s  impact  on SMP is reasonable , taking 
into consideration the share of this fuel in the generation mix (see tables 2.1 and 2.2) . Yet, the 
positive coefficient reflects the strong correlation between SMP and Natural Gas prices and 
more precisely corresponds to the SMP-GAS prices spark spread8, defined here as the 
difference between SMP and daily Balancing price of gas (see figure 5.1).  The escalation of 
spark spread volatility to increasing values is evident after the second quarter of 2010, exerting 
a positive effect on SMP.  The reforms in the market may have broken this positive co-variation, 
a fact difficult to be captured by the model by only considering changes in the levels of these 
two quantities.  Figure 5.2 shows the percent change (annual rate) of monthly SMP versus 
Natural Gas prices. The spikes in spark spread, SMP ex-post and SMP Das observed in the 
quarters shown in the graph reflect the strong positive co-movement of these series. 
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8 We have used monthly weighted-average import price (WAIP) and the daily balancing gas (HTAE) for the same 
months, given in DESFA’s internet site from Jan 2009 to Dec 2011. The data are also available in RAE’s website. As 
spark spread here we mean the difference of SMP and Balancing price of Nat gas. 
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Figure 5.1 Monthly average Nat Gas price versus SMP in GEM (Sep. 2008-11). 
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Figure 5.2 % change (annual rate) of SMP and Nat Gas prices  in GEM (Sep. 2008-11) 
 
The total export of energy (totexports) increase SMP as expected, a rational outcome as energy 
extracted from the system reduces the supply for domestic usage. The heaviest positive impact 
on SMP comes from Load i.e. the total demand of all customers of the system. The larger the 
demand (i.e. the further shift to the right of the demand curve) the much higher the new 
equilibrium point i.e. the point of intersection of Supply and Demand Curves. The coefficient 
corresponding to load has the largest value indicating that SMP is mostly driven by this 
variable, as it is well known also through models based on fundamental analysis. So, an increase 
of 1% in the daily demand, over the period of our analysis, leads to a multiple increase, ceteris 
paribus, in the level of SMP of 1.56%. An example enhances the view of this strong positive 
dependence. In November 2011, load (demand) increased of about 8% compare to the 
previous year same month, due to an increased usage of air-conditioning for heating (oil was 
considered a more expensive alternative to electricity for households), causing an upward 
pressure to SMP ( i.e an 8%x1.56%=12.5% increase in SMP). 
An increase of 1% in the Brent Oil price will result, on the average, in an increase of 0.25% 
while a similar increase in the level of production by a station using heavy fuel oil is 
accompanied by a positive and negligible increase in SMP (0.006%). This result is in accordance 
with the relatively very small share (on the order of 5% to 6% each year) of this type of 
generation, as shown on Table 2.1.   
The need for linking hydro generation patterns to reservoir levels is further enforced by 
considering their strong correlation with the corresponding energy reserves that are strongly 
and negatively correlated with SMP (see correlations table in the Appendix 4).  
A combination of factors occurring concurrently can have a significant impact on SMP, even 
reducing it to almost zero level. For example, a significant drop in load (demand), as in Easter 
holiday, combined with compulsory generation quantities due to renewables, Plant’s technical 
minima and imports, can create an imbalance between production and consumption (an excess 
generated quantity in our case). Due to this excess, imports can be offered at a zero value and it 
is necessary to impose a minimum value (curtailed value) in this extreme situation. In 2009 we 
have witnessed such an extreme case.  
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6. The Impacts of RMRs on SMP 
The main message coming out the table 4.3 is that the regulatory interventions in the market 
architecture have significantly affected the conditional mean of the SMP price and partially its 
conditional volatility (only RMR6 at 5% level is significant). The results suggest that the 
average SMP was affected by the regulatory reforms, ceteris paribus, with upward, downward 
trends and spikes attributed to the signs and intensities of the found coefficients. 
In the mean equation, the dummy variables representing the Regulatory Market Reforms, RMR, 
were found to have a significant (most at a 1% level) effect on SMPep, except RM2 and RMR8 
that found to have no impact. Positive impact  have RMR1, RMR3, RMR5 and RMR7 and 
negative impact RMR4 and RMR6. The highest positive impact on SMP is due to market 
reformation RMR5 (value of coefficient 0.26) regarding the Cost Recovery mechanism, CRM 
(see page 10 and the reference mentioned  there). The next largest positive impact (0.23) 
comes from RMR3 reform, regarding the first change of methodology of calculating system 
marginal price (SMP).  
 
It is pointed out here that this reform was not expected by the Regulator to have any significant 
effect on the evolution of SMP (RAE 2010, and Kalantzis F., et.al, 2012).  A very crucial point 
here is that, in general, there are motives of Generators for a systematic abuse of CRM (in case 
this mechanism is in place) that allows them to bidding below their marginal cost. This strategy 
of Generators became possible after the launching of RMR6 which in combination with CRM 
gave the Generators the opportunity to make extra profits, when SMP exceeded their cost (this 
market rule allows a generator to offer 30% of its capacity at a price less than its minimum 
marginal cost, while at the same time they can reap a retained compensation at this cost plus 
10%). Therefore, the overall, combined, effects of RMR5 and RMR6 have a rather distorting 
effect on the market. In the time of writing this paper, the authors were aware of RAE´s 
intentions to propose measures to strongly reduce this distortion by changing or even 
removing CRM. It turned out that RMR6 is a critical exogenous (relative to fundamental factors) 
qualitative factor in shaping the dynamics of SMP. Even though this reform allows the dispatch 
of various Units for providing reserves to the system (a crucial factor in securing Unit´s viability 
in a period of excessive capacity), it heavily suppresses SMP to values not reflecting generation 
cost. The negative effects of RMR5 and RMR6 on SMP have also crated two side effects. First, 
due to suppressed SMP, and given the feed-in-tariffs mechanism on which RES producers are 
compensated on a special levy level, the need for this purpose cash outflows increased 
dramatically and secondly the creation of SMP values not corresponding to the ones expected 
by the fundamental underlying operating variables of the system that governs SMP. 
As far as the impact of RMR8 on SMP is concerned, coefficient β25 in table 4.3 was found to be 
no significant. The Regulator however had expected an increase to SMP due to this reform.  This 
is due to the fact that the length of the data set after the date of enactment of this reform, Sept. 
2011, is very small, therefore the effect on SMP of this dummy variable, on average, is 
insignificant. However, having a look at the results of year 2011, we see that this tax, which 
induced asymmetric effects on gas-fired electricity generation versus lignite and imports 
(actually the variable cost of the gas plants increased 5.4 €/MWh), overall has induced a rise in 
SMP. During the same year, 2011, the combination of this reform with a decreased Hydro 
generation (represented by variable Hydrogen in the model) had, as a result, a sustainable SMP 
rise, from the date of application of RMR8 onwards. More specifically, the daily average ex-post 
SMP increased from 63.71 €/MWh on 31st August 2011 to 90.75 €/MWh on 1st September (+ 
42% ). In general, the average SMP during 2011 before RM8 was 65.00 €/MWh while after the 
reform changed to 83.86 €/MWh. The average price in 2011 was 71.70 €/MWh compared to 
52.25 €/MWh in 2010 (see table 3.3). 
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Comparable impact to the one by RMR3 has the reform RMR1 (0.177) which corresponds to 
adoption of the mandatory pool (ex-post settlement) as the preferred electricity market model 
in Greece. This reform that changed the methodology of estimating SMP, in combination with 
RMR3, seems to have generated not an “additive” but a “multiplicative” effect. One natural 
explanation is that before the enactment of those two reforms, SMP was determined mainly by 
Lignite generating Units having an average marginal cost of about 27€/MWh, which offer the 
implementation of RMR3 the same units determine SMP only during the period off-peak hours, 
while at the same time Natural Gas and Oil Units (with a marginal cost of around 60€/MWh) 
started to set SMP for largest time share during peak hours (almost 60% of total hours). 
If we multiply the difference in marginal cost (60€/MWh - 27€/MWh = 33€/MWh) with the 
time share 60% mentioned above we have a net effect of 33€/MWhX0.6020€/MWh. 
 
Table 6.1: Impacts of Regulatory Reforms on SMPep 
 
Market Reform with 
significant impact 
Coefficient Value % impact on SMPep* 
RMR1 β18 0.1769 15.35 
RMR3 β20 0.2347 25.86 
RMR4 β21 -0.1517 -14.00 
RMR5 β22 0.2623 29.60 
RMR6 β23 -0.3641 -30.50 
RMR7 β24 0.1071 11.30 
 
*Note: the % impact of a RMRν dummy variable (changing for 0 to1), ceteris paribus, having a 
coefficient βν is            . 
 
Table 6.1 gives the impact of RMRs on SMP. For example, the SMP (ex post) value on the day of 
application of RMR3 (January 13, 2006) was 41.04€/MWh. On next day, the price went to 
49.36€/MWh i.e. an increase of 8.32€/MWh (20.3%), on January 15 went to 48.65€/MWh i.e. 
an 18.54% increase and three days later, on January 16, the price increased to 52.05€/MWh, i.e. 
26.82% close to 25.86%, as given in the table above. The market realized the impact (due to its 
inertia) after 3 days. 
 
Based on the above remarks and the entries in table 2.5, we observe that our model revealed 
different effects of RMR6, RMR7 on SMP,   than the Regulator’s expected ones. Should this 
model had been available to the regulator before the launching of the reforms, it would be very 
useful in providing a better picture on the expected effects of those reforms as well as on RMR4 
and RMR5.  
 
The conditional variance equation 
 
From table 4.3 we see that the quantified effects of the reforms on the volatility of SMP are 
negligible, except reform RMR6 which is significant at 5% level, however with negligible 
magnitude (0.0004%). However, we must point out here that since the reforms affect 
significant the average SMP returns and that the two equations are coupled (see system of 
equations 6.10), these reforms affect volatility indirectly.  
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7.  Comparing conditional volatility of SMP in GEM with SMP in other Markets 
 
Table 7.1 shows the parameter estimates of the AR(1)/GARCH(1,1) model on SMP, applied in 
various electricity markets taken from the work of Escribano et al. (2002), amended by the 
results found in this work for the Greek electricity market and the work of Petrella  (2012) for 
the Italian market.  So, we can compare the rate or speed of mean-reversion of the Greek 
market with those in the paper. The factor A1+G1 expresses the persistence parameter of the 
conditional volatilities to its mean value. In Financial markets it is common that G is larger 
than 0.7 but A tend to be less than 0.25. If A+G is close to one then the persistence is high  and 
a shock in the series will decay slowly. A  low persistence value i.e  A+G<<1 leads to the fast 
decay of the shock to its long-run volatility. If A+G=1 we have a non-stationary or non-
stationary or Integrated GARCH model(I-GARCH) for which term structure forecasts do not 
converge (there is no mean reversion) 
 
Table 7.1: Variance equation parameters of GARCH(1,1) model applied in various markets  
                     (source : Alexander C., 1998,  Escribano  et al., 2002, Petrella et al., 2012) 
 
Financial Markets A1 G1 A1+G1 Half –life (days)9 
Equities     
UK 0.105 0.810 0.915 11 
GE 0.188 0.712 0.900 7 
US 0.271 0.641 0.912 8 
JP 0.049 0.935 0.984 43 
NL 0.146 0.829 0.975 28 
USD rates     
DEM 0.113 0.747 0.860 5 
JPY 0.102 0.763 0.865 5 
GBP 0.028 0.935 0.963 19 
NLG 0.125 0.735 0.860 5 
ESP 0.160 0.597 0.757 3 
AUD 0.241 0.674 0.915 8 
Index     
ASE (Greece) 0.100 0.900 1.00 Undefined 
Electricity Markets     
Greece 0.13 0.79 0.92 9 
Italy 0.47 0.576 1.04 Undefined 
Spain 0.18 0.78 0.96 17 
Nord Pool 0.41 0.59 1.00 Undefined 
Argentina 0.85 0.37 1.22 Undefined 
Australia (Victoria) 1.07 0.49 1.56 Undefined 
New Zeeland 0.40 0.60 1.00 Undefined 
PJM 1.11 0.49 1.61 Undefined 
 
 
 
 
 
In the markets of table 7.2,   Nord Pool,  Argentina, Australia, New Zeeland, Italy and  PJM  have 
persistence parameter equal to one so there is no mean reversion. A low degree of mean-
                                                          
9
 Half-life is defined as log(0.5)/log(A1+G1)  
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reversion can be explained, according to Escribano, (2002), by the fact that in some of the 
markets the proportion of electricity generated by hydro resources is extremely large,  as  in 
Nord Pool (in the Greek market hydro share accounts for 24% of net installed capacity in 2008-
2009, table 2.1). The expected inter-temporal substitution between inputs is more intense in 
the markets with large amount of Hydro-generation than in the markets with low one, 
indicating that hydro stations (reservoirs) play the role of the indirect storage of electricity. In 
the other markets of the table we observe smaller persistence values indicating a higher degree 
of mean-reversion since generators cannot use inventories to smooth out shocks. It takes nine 
days in Greece and seventeen in Spain for the conditional volatility to return to their long-run 
mean value. GEM in this respect behaves like the first three equities market while Spanish 
market like the USD/GBP rates.  We also point out here that mean-reversion in load (demand) 
or in temperature are the main factors of causing the mean-reversion in electricity prices. 
 
 Wolak (1997) and Lucia and Schwartz (2002) have also shown that SMP are more “turbulent” 
or volatile in markets dominated by hydroelectric power. Large dry periods result in significant 
lower hydro generation, causing in turn an increase, on the average, in SMP. In general,  
instability of weather conditions have a significant effect on the mean-reversion process 
(actually its dynamics resembles a unit root process with autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic errors).   
 
The oligopoly microstructure of Greek electricity market (at least at its early stage) and the 
particular rules in place for compensating the Generators, during the transitional period from 
less oligopolistic to more competitive, are the main factors in the evolution of this different 
market, compared to “mature” markets e.g. NordPool, Australia etc. (Escribano et al., 2002). 
 
The way stranded costs are treated in a market creates conflictive incentives on the few 
participating players  (Federico G. and A. Whitmore, 1999). The interaction of incentives has 
direct effects on energy price risk. There is a negative dependence between stranded costs to 
be paid to generators and the price established in the pool. Actually, generators earn higher 
profits from their participation in the pool, in the case that the prices are higher than a known 
and pre-established level, but they will get a lower amount of standard costs. These conflicting 
interests among generators (which depend on the market’s microstructure i.e. expectations on 
the likelihood of receiving stranded costs, generator’s market share etc.) have a predictable 
impact on the equilibrium price i.e. SMP. 
 
 
Table 7.2 % Conditional Volatilities of log SMP and ASE Index 
 
 
 SMP log returns ASE log returns 
 EWMA (λ=0.94) ARMAΧ/GARCH EWMA (λ=0.94) ARMAΧ/GARCH 
max 34.60 26.30 6.46 5.75 
min 3.66 3.92 0.31 0.62 
mean 16.12 9.31 1.60 1.70 
St.dev 5.95 4.15 0.91 0.86 
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8. Conclusions 
 
In the beginning of this work we stated its targets, briefly the detection of possible effects of the 
regulatory changes that have been made in the structure of GEM,  on the dynamic evolution of 
SMP as it is reflected by its statistical properties or stylized effects. We have found that GEM has 
the majority of stylized characteristics that other electricity markets exhibit and how these 
compare with those in financial markets. We have given an in depth explanation of the sign and 
the intensity of the impacts of both fundamental to the GEM factors as well as of the qualitative 
or dummy variables constructed to capture the regulatory changes.  We strongly believe that 
our findings will contribute to efforts of the authorities entitled to make GEM more efficient and 
competitive. Our results will be useful in better understanding of the factors of the underline 
dynamics of SMP, an information needed both in restructuring GEM as well as in better 
developing the forward market a requirement for compliance of GEM with the Target model.  
We have not detected any leverage effects in GEM as other workers have found in other 
markets (Karakatsani N., and Bunn,D.W., 2010), Bowden and Payne ,2008 ,  Knittel and Roberts, 
2005 , Hadsell et al.,2004 ). Is this result explained by a lower degree of convexity of the supply 
curve in GEM compared to higher degree of convexity in other markets, as Kanamura 
(Kanamura , 2009) suggests? 
Our findings enhances the results of Petrella et al. (2012) for the Italian market. We agree with 
their remark that if an adequate number of similar works on other markets appear, then with 
some degree of confidence, we could generalize our findings and state that changes in the 
market architecture have indeed a significant effect on the dynamics of wholesale price. 
A drawback of using dummy variables for the reforms is that the response of the market’s 
agents to these stimuli is not smoothed but abrupt like a step function. Furthermore, if there is 
a time lapse between the announcement of a reform and its implementation,  this allows agents 
in advance, to take advantage of the reforms by adjusting themselves according to their 
position in the market.  
We have not consider in this work, all possible interactions between different regulatory 
reforms. A more detail analysis is needed in future work as suggested by a growing,  recent and 
focused on this topic, literature (child et.al, 2008).     
Any required regulatory reforms that have to be applied, must be designed in such a way that 
facilitate the gradual development of competitive environment, allowing at the same time the 
minimization of the State’s intervention (in areas that this is necessary)  to the market as well 
as of  the total cost of market transactions. The reforms also must create a secure environment 
for all participants. For this reason, any reforms that have a transitional characteristic (as most 
of the RMR considered in this study) must be evaluated according to the holistic or systemic 
effects on the market due to their interdependence and the fact that they are inherently 
coupled with the fundamental variables of the market, as the modeling results described in this 
paper has revealed. The ultimate target, therefore, of any regulatory reform is to create motives 
and signals to the agents of the market, so they have a collective movement to more 
competitive behaviors and attitudes and suitable investment decisions. Towards this end, this 
paper is believed to contribute to the current efforts of the Regulator and other  relevant 
market bodies, towards restructuring the market as well as in helping developing tools / 
processes / rules etc., that will allow the fair pricing of product and service available in the 
Greek Electricity market as well as in attracting investors in the market. 
We also hope that the modeling results presented here can enhance the efforts of the reformers 
of the GEM by helping them in detecting more accurately the factors of uncertainty, both 
domestic and international, that influence heavily the Greek market and must be taken into 
 49 
 
account when designing regulatory measures to face the continuously changing internal and 
external environment. 
However, we have to point out here that the phase out of any transitional mechanism without 
first a detailed and in depth examination of the side effects this might have on the current 
stability of the market, due to the strong interlinks and coupling nature these mechanisms have 
with fundamental variables and have created all these years the current market microstructure, 
may have an adverse impact on the available long term generation capacity. Care must be taken 
therefore in securing future adequate availability by avoiding a forced canceling of mechanism 
ready in place that may put in danger the current equilibrium in the market. 
This means that the impact of the change in the method of calculating SMP in the Greek market 
was extremely strong. It has completely change the structure of the underlying dynamic-
stochastic process of SMP i.e. its statistical properties or stylized facts, causing forcedly its 
future dynamics evolution to be more volatile therefore more unpredictable. This regime 
switching of the process from a stable or tranquil state to a new turbulent and unstable one, 
give us an example of how an external perturbation (here a change in the regulatory 
framework) to the stochastic system that describes SMP, no matter how small or large it is, can 
cause the system to behave completely differently. This is a manifestation of nonlinearity and 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions of the electricity market systems which are very 
complex and nonlinear, requiring an extensive amount of simulations before attempting any 
change on their structure.  
 
Since an electricity market is a high dimensional setup (a high dimensional manifold on which 
SMP is evolving, as referred in the jargon of Stochastic and Dynamical System theory) it is 
natural to consider that all the distortions in the market as well as the history of external – 
“exogenous” interventions in the market, is well incorporated in the dynamics of SMP, since this 
variable is coupled, in a nonlinear – complex way, with the driving fundamental variables in the 
market. Therefore, any movements in the explanatory variables used in modeling SMP 
(including the regulatory reforms entered in the model as dummy variables), are well 
“encapsulated” in the dynamics of SMP (Bask M., et. al, 2007, Broomhead D.S. et al, 1986, 
Takens F., 1987, Serletis A., 2007). We have extracted both qualitative and quantitative 
information from the SMP time series, that reveal how the factors have shaped its behavior and 
at the same time, have generated as bi-products,  the market’s structural frictions or 
distortions.  
 
Even though there is not an easy job to attribute to each separate market distortion a factor or a 
combination of factors, due to the fact that, as we have said the system under examination is 
high-dimensional, non-linear and (as a consequence) very complex, we consider that the 
detected stylized facts of SMP, in our present analysis, can reveal an insight of the Market’s 
distortions. Therefore, another question that is arising is whether the measures or policies of 
the regulator mentioned above are the appropriate ones in a sense that they are capable of 
removing permanently these distortions or of removing just the symptoms. 
 
The combined effects on SMP of low demand (as in Greece due to economic crisis) and increase 
generation by IPP´s were more intense in 2011 when two new CCGT plants were added and the 
load reached very low levels. The effects on SMP were more apparent when IPP´s underwent 
maintenance for some period (therefore Unit availability reduced) exerting an upward 
movement on SMP. 
As we have mentioned earlier a crucial prerequisite for GEM to be more efficient in the link 
between wholesale (SMP) and retail prices. Therefore regulated prices must gradually be 
adjusted, in order to eliminate cross-subsidy distortions and eventually produce retail prices 
that reflect as close as possible wholesale market costs. 
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